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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this seminar is to examine the relationship between
international treaties and constitutional provisions in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. This event is part of a work program resulting from
an agreement on ministerial consultations between the governments of
Mexico and the United States on U.S. Submission 9601. Canada agreed
to participate in the implementation of this work program.
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U.S. Submission 9601 was filed on June 13th, 1996. On January
27th, the U.S. National Administrative Office issued a public report rec-
ommending ministerial consultations with Mexico. The Submission con-
cerns freedom of association for federal sector workers. A larger union
was certified as a representative majority union. The administrative deci-
sion was subsequently overturned by the Mexican federal courts, and a
secret ballot election was held. The petitioning union lost the election,
and final registration and recognition was awarded to the majority union.
The U.S. National Administrative Office ("NAO") found that Mex-
ico had acted to enforce the specific requirements of relevant Mexican
labor laws in this case. However, the NAO further found that important
issues were raised as to whether those laws conformed with the Mexican
Constitution or international treaties ratified by Mexico. These include re-
quirements that
(1) Unions obtain prior registration from government authorities;
(2) Only one union can exist in each government workplace; and
(3) Federal sector unions may affiliate to only one national
federation.
The issues raised in the report involved internationally recognized
freedom of association principles. The NAO cited extensive reports by
the International Labor Organization in support of its findings as well as
decisions of the Supreme Court of Mexico, which found that a single
union restriction is unconstitutional at the state level.
Consistent with the provisions of the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), the National Administrative Office rec-
ommended that consultations be pursued to clarify the effects of constitu-
tional provisions in international treaties that guarantee freedom of asso-
ciation and protection of the right to organize.
The NAALC is the authority under which we review these types of
cases. The Agreement has given all three countries; the United States,
Mexico, and Canada; the unique opportunity to raise and examine labor
issues of concern. The participation of all three NAALC countries in the
symposium is further evidence that we can cooperatively address difficult
and sensitive labor issues as intended by the framers of the agreement.
By sharing information, hopefully, we can enhance our respective knowl-
edge and understanding of each other's legal and constitutional histories
and interpretations. Creating a base of knowledge regarding our labor
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laws, policies, and legal institutions is crucial to the success of imple-
menting the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
INTRODUCTION OF PANELISTS AND STAFF
United States
Dave Stewart is a legal adviser for Human Rights and Refugees in
the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. His
principle responsibility is advising the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor and Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.
Hurst Hannum is a professor from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts. Professor
Hannum teaches courses in international organizations and international
human rights law.
Professor Ben Aaron has served on the ILO Committee of Experts
regarding the Implication of Conventions and Recommendations.
Mr. Stewart will give us the Government's perspective on interna-
tional conventions. Professor Hannum will focus on general human rights
conventions, and Professor Aaron will focus on ILO conventions and the
ratification and what the ratification of these conventions means.
Mexico
Mexico considers it important to gain a better understanding of the
constitutional systems of our counterparts, of our partners, and thus im-
prove mutual relationships.
Javier Moctezuma Barragan works in the Office of the Secretary of
Labor and Social Welfare of Mexico. He has had a long career in public
service. He has worked at the Mexican Embassy to the United States as
the general director of our Government Office, and also been a legal ad-
viser to the Government. He has authored many publications, including
one on remodelar iglesias (ph), electoral reform, legislation, and many
others. He'll be talking about international treaties and our constitutional
system.
Dr. Manuel Oropeza is a graduate of the National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico. He is a representative to the National Electoral Insti-
tute and a member and consultant to our National Congress, Academic
Secretary of Humanities at the Autonomous University, and a founder of
the Legal Research Institute at Guadalajara University. He is currently a
researcher at the Autonomous University of Mexico Legal Institute. He
will be discussing constitutional principles and international treaties, spe-
cifically with regard to Mexico.
Professor Loretta Ortiz Ahlf is also a graduate of the law school in
Mexico and is legal director for the National Council for Culture and the
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Arts and works at the Panamerican University in the Martinez Romero
Diplomatic School in Mexico. Professor Ortiz will be talking about the
implementation of international treaties in the Mexican system.
Canada
Ton Zuijdwijk was part of the negotiating team for Canada during
the labor side agreement negotiation. He is senior counsel in the Trade
Law Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade. As a result, he will speak about the Government perspective on
international treaties and constitutional systems. Mr. Zuijdwijk is also an
adjunct law professor at the University of Ottawa. He teaches a course
on European Community Law. He holds an LLB from the University of
Toronto, a LLM degree is from Layden University in the Netherlands
and Columbia University, a Master's in International Affairs from Co-
lumbia, and a Doctorate in International Law from the University of To-
ronto. His thesis was on human rights petitions to the United Nations.
Robert Howse is the associate director of the Center for the Study
of State and Market at the University of Toronto. He is also an associate
of the University's Institute for Policy Analysis and an adjunct scholar of
the C.D. Howe Institute in Canada. He's a former public servant who
worked at the Department of External Affairs before it changed its name.
He's also a prolific author. Professor Howse was educated at the Univer-
sity of Toronto and Harvard Law School with an LLM.
Sophie Dufour is assistant professor in the faculty of law at Univer-
site de Sherbrooke in Sherbrooke, Quebec. She holds a Doctor of Juridi-
cal Science degree from the Faculty of Law at Lavalle University. She
completed her thesis on the social dimension and international trade sys-
tem. She holds Master's and Law Degrees from Cambridge in England
and the Osgoode School of Law at York University in Ontario. Sophie
Dufour has previously worked as a researcher at the WTO and the Inter-
national Labor Office and as a consultant in legal affairs at the ILO and
is also the author of a number of publications in this area.
Professor Howse will speak more generally on international treaties
and the Canadian constitution while Professor Dufour will focus more
specifically on the ILO, although they will both cover more areas than
that as well.
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
PRESENTATION BY THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
DAVID STEWART: Several questions of terminology need to be
dealt with at the outset. First, in terms of U.S. law, the difference be-
tween treaties and executive agreements; secondly, a brief description of
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the procedure by which treaties and executive agreements are adopted in
our system; third, a brief description of the status of treaties in U.S. law;
fourth, a few aspects of the limitations on the treaty power; fifth, a topic
I think we need to mention for further discussion, which is some aspects
of the implication of the federal treaty power for our constituent states in
our federal system; and then sixth, the topic which bears more discussion
than I can give it, and that's the distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties.
The first question is the distinction between treaty and executive
agreement. In its most general form, it can be explained very simply.
Treaties require the concurrence of the United States Senate and execu-
tive agreements do not. In our view, both treaties and executive agree-
ments are international agreements from the point of view of interna-
tional law. Our parlance does not distinguish between bilateral and
multilateral treaties; both are handled the same way, although in their ap-
plication they may possibly have some different dimensions.
There is sometimes a very interesting and difficult debate over
whether a particular instrument is, or should be treated as, a treaty or an
executive agreement. Some of you may be familiar with the dispute a
number of years ago over the agreement with the People's Republic of
Hungary to return the Crown of Saint Stephen, the Hungarian coronation
regalia which was taken during World War II. This dispute resulted in lit-
igation which asked a district court to decide the issue. The court de-
cided in favor of the Government's view that the instrument was not a
treaty. That case was brought by an individual named Dole who, of
course, was subsequently a Presidential candidate. I mention that fact
only to highlight the fact that this issue sometimes has serious political
implications.
Executive agreements come in different varieties. There are those
resting on the President's authority under the Constitution alone, some-
times called sole executive agreements, and there are those resting on the
joint authority of the President and the Congress. Those in the latter cate-
gory are entered into by the President on the basis of enabling or author-
izing, or even implementing, legislation, either adopted prior to the nego-
tiation of the agreement or in some cases subsequently. You may be
familiar, for example, with the Iranian hostage agreement and remember
the important case of Dames & Moore.' Here, the Supreme Court found
implicit prior congressional approval, concurrence, or acquiescence, de-
pending on your view, in the arrangements that the President had made,
and upheld their constitutionality.
1. 453 U.S. 654, 101 S.Ct. 2972 (1981).
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There can also be an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty. For
example, in the case of a treaty that has a dispute settlement mechanism,
the subsequent method of submitting a dispute to the agreed mechanism
might be an executive agreement authorized by the treaty, or in the case
of mutual legal assistance treaties there may be a specific undertaking to
reach subsequent understandings on the form of evidence to be submit-
ted. In these ways, you can have subsidiary executive agreements.
In our practice, formal treaties are in fact the least numerous kinds
of agreements. Pure executive agreements are only slightly more numer-
ous, and by far the largest number in our national history have been the
Congressionally-approved or joint Congressional-Presidential agreements.
The second question is that of procedure. Our process of formalizing
adherence to treaties is relatively simple. I do not say "ratification" be-
cause ratification is not in fact specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
and some treaties, provide for ratification of signature only for a limited
time.
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution says that the
President has the power by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.
Once negotiations have been concluded, or in the case of a multilateral
treaty, the text has been adopted or approved, and once the relevant in-
strument has been signed by a duly authorized official, it is submitted in
ordinary practice by the Secretary of State to the President. The President
then transmits the treaty to the Senate for its consideration. The treaty
goes first to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then to the full
Senate, which endorses the treaty by a resolution of advice and consent
either of ratification or in some cases of accession. The President then
completes the process of ratification by depositing the appropriate instru-
ment and proclaiming the treaty. By comparison, executive agreements
do not require the advice and consent of the Senate, and they are not
ever mentioned in the Constitution at all.
Sometimes the distinction between a treaty and an executive agree-
ment is a matter of discussion between the Congress or the Senate and
the Executive. For example, in the case of the "Budapest Treaty on Mi-
croorganisms, ' ' 2 the Executive was prepared to submit it to the Senate as
a treaty for advice and consent, but following consultations and the ad-
vice of the Senate, it was in fact handled as an executive agreement for
domestic purposes, and we then submitted an instrument of approval.
2. Budapest Treaty on Microorganisms, Done at Budapest, Apr. 28, 1977, entered
into force Aug. 19, 1980. T.I.A.S. 9678, 19 I.L.M. 1542.
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Now, for the obvious reasons on certain occasions, there can be
congressional hostility to executive agreements that aren't founded in any
measure in congressional authorization. There is a long history of this
hostility dating back to the infamous Bricker Amendment in the late
1940's and early 1950's.3 Those of you who practice or teach in this area
will know that since the 1972 adoption of the so-called Case Act,4 Con-
gress has required us to submit all executive agreements within a matter
of months to the Congress for its consideration and examination.
The third subject is the status of treaties in domestic law. It's impor-
tant to emphasize that we treat the question of whether a treaty or an
agreement is internationally binding as one question, and its effectiveness
and status in domestic law as a separate question. In this sense, we are a
"dualist" country on this issue. It is quite possible that the United States
could be bound by international law, but the treaty in question would not
be legally effective domestically. If it risks non-compliance, that's, of
course, an event that, as a Government lawyer, I'm paid to try to avoid.
We want to be able to carry out our obligations under international
agreements and we simultaneously adhere to the rule that domestic law
cannot be properly invoked as an excuse for non-performance of interna-
tional obligations.
Under the Constitution duly-ratified treaties are "the Supreme Law
of the Land," equal in stature to enacted federal statutes. Article VI of
our Constitution says, "This Constitution and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made or
which shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state not with-
standing." 5 As I hope we will hear, this provision bears a resemblance to
the parallel provision in the Mexican constitution.
6
3. The Bricker Amendment takes its name from Ohio Senator John Bricker, who led
an effort in the early 1950's to enact a proposed amendment to the Constitution. The ver-
sion recommended by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1953 stated, "A provision of a
treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect". Gerald
Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 254-55 (13th ed., 1997).
4. Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-403, Section 1, 86 Stat. 619.
5. U.S. CONST., Art. V1, Cl. 2.
6. MEX. CONST., Title VII, art. 133. The relevant language states "This Constitution,
the laws of the Congress of the Union which emanate therefrom, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made in accordance therewith by the President of the Republic, with the
approval of the Senate, shall be the Supreme Law throughout the Union. The judges of
every State shall be bound by said Constitution, the laws, the treaties, notwithstanding
any contradictory provisions that may appear in the Constitution or laws of the states."
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In our system, therefore, duly-ratified treaties prevail over inconsis-
tent state and local law. To the extent of any inconsistency, they also pre-
vail over previously adopted federal law. They may be displaced in turn
by subsequently enacted federal law. There are a number of interesting
cases on this subject, exploring the question as to whether the Congress
has in fact the authority to put the United States into violation of previ-
ously adopted treaties. There is also a body of interpretive doctrine
adopted by the courts to the effect that treaties and statutes should, wher-
ever possible, be read compatibly, that congressional intent to modify ob-
ligations under a treaty should be explicit. Thus only where the conflict
between the law and a treaty is irreconcilable and Congressional intent is
clear can the latter in time be given precedence.
A recent case in which this conundrum was addressed by a district
court, and one which will be familiar to many, is the Palestine Liberation
Organization case in the late 1980's in New York.7 In a statute, Congress
effectively directed the executive branch to shut down the PLO Observer
Mission, which of course claimed on its part that it had a right to be rep-
resented and to exist before the United Nations under our bilateral head-
quarters agreement. The court found that in that case there was no spe-
cific congressional intent to require a violation of the treaty, thereby
putting the executive in something of a box. In any event, that was an
example of how a court will go to some length to avoid finding a direct
conflict or requirement to give voice to a treaty over an existing statutory
requirement.
Importantly, in our system it is now clear that treaty obligations are
subordinate to the Constitution. There has been some discussion and con-
cern over the years on this point, including the very important case of
Reed v. Covert8 in 1957. It is clear that an agreement with a foreign na-
tion cannot confer power on the Congress or on any other branch of the
Government, which is free from restraints of the Constitution. It is possi-
ble for a treaty, of course, to provide greater rights to individuals or to
elaborate on the rights of individuals which can be asserted against a
branch of the government. In that sense, the power of the Constitution
would be working at its minimum rather than at its maximum. Executive
agreements, likewise, are also subject to the Constitution.
A fourth question to answer is what are the limitations on the treaty
power. If a treaty or an executive agreement cannot deprive a citizen of a
right given under the First Amendment, for example, are there other limi-
7. U.S. v. the Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F.Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
8. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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tations on the treaty power? Let me just address briefly two questions,
which I think will come up later in discussion.
In the first case, the question is the separation of powers. Can the
treaty power be used to alter the allocation of authority between the
branches of the federal government? In an important case from the 1920,
Missouri v. Holland,9 the Supreme Court made clear that Congress may
act under the treaty power when it might not otherwise have the author-
ity to act. In that case, Congress enacted a statute which was held to be
unconstitutional. The U.S. then negotiated a relevant treaty with the Ca-
nadian government. A statute was enacted pursuant to that treaty and up-
held by the Court. Ultimately in that situation, the Court said that under
the treaty authority Congress may have the authority to enact a statute
which it might not otherwise have under the Constitution.'0 I do believe,
and I'd like to hear more discussion of this point, that under the Cana-
dian system that might not be the case. They may have a different rule.
The other aspect of this question of limitation concerns the exercise
of the treaty power in terms of its subject matter. Are there subjects
under our Constitution which are not appropriate for the treaty power?
There is nothing specific on this issue in the Constitution, and the Su-
preme Court in Missouri v. Holland" left that issue open. It said clearly
there are some matters of great importance which the executive needs to
deal with, and if Congress cannot deal with them under a statutory grant
of authority then it can do so under its treaty authority.
Another very important case, the Curtiss-Wright 2 case, suggested
that the treaty authority is somehow separate from the constraints of our
Constitution, that it exists as a spin-off or a derivative aspect of the law
of nations and is inherent in sovereignty. In this way, it was not at all
limited. We have yet to find a topic, a subject matter, which has been in
fact not appropriate for the treaty authority, but I'll give just one exam-
ple for people to think about.
In the case of the human rights treaties, we sometimes run up
against the argument that agreements adopted in the U.N. touch on sub-
jects which may not be appropriate subjects of regulation under our con-
stitutional system, but are nonetheless appropriate for the treaty power.
This issue is raised by some articles of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, which also poses the question whether a treaty can authorize
the government to impose some kind of limitation on private regulatory
9. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
10. Id. at 433-34. The pertinent text reads "It is open to question whether the au-
thority of the U.S. means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention."
11. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
12. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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action. For example, we have expressed our understanding in the human
rights treaties that we will not implement the treaty past the point at
which our government may properly intrude into private affairs. Thus, we
see the relevance of the limitation of private action under our Constitu-
tion. This, however, is an open question, and I hope we'll hear more
about it in the future.
Fifth, and very briefly, we must ask about the relationship of treaties
to the states. Treaties are federal law under our Constitution. States are
not allowed to enter into treaties under the Constitution. Now, this is not
a complete prohibition because states are allowed to enter into a compact
or an agreement with a foreign power if they have Congressional con-
sent. States historically have had a measure of authority to implement in-
ternational law and do in fact enter into forms of agreements with for-
eign countries.
The question that is of particular interest to me in the area of human
rights is whether adoption of a treaty on a subject which is otherwise
within the purview of state and local governments somehow "federal-
izes" that issue, reigning the federal government into an area which it
might not otherwise be competent to act. As I have already mentioned,
we have concerns about this in the area of human rights. Another reason
for concern has to do with the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Zchern-
ing v. Miller,13 in which even in instances where the federal government
hadn't acted, the Supreme Court held that an Oregon statute having to do
with inheritance matters was an impermissible intrusion into the area of
foreign affairs. It was not a question of preemption because the Govern-
ment hadn't in fact acted in that field. It was a question really of superi-
ority, and one has to wonder how that can apply in other areas.
Lastly and very briefly, we come to the difficult issue of self-
executing treaties and non-self-executing treaties. We have had this dis-
tinction in our law since the early 19th century. It is not in the Constitu-
tion itself, but the Supreme Court has adopted it, and it has become a
part of our Constitutional doctrine. In its simplest sense, the doctrine says
that self-executing treaties, once ratified, become fully effective as do-
mestic law. Non-self-executing treaties by comparison require implement-
ing legislation. And in the latter case, it is the legislation and not the
treaty which has the effect of domestic law.
This is not a distinction unique to the United States. One can say
generally that common law countries acknowledge the distinction and
generally favor non-self-executing approaches. Under British law a treaty
does not become effective unless and until it has been specifically imple-
13. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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mented by the legislature. In Australia there has been some recent discus-
sion about this subject as well. The doctrine adopted by the English High
Court said simply that a treaty is not part of English law until it has been
incorporated.
By comparison, most civil law countries recognize the distinction
but favor self-executing treaties. That is the case, for example, under Ar-
ticle 25 of the Federal Republic of Germany constitution. 4 The United
States, on the other hand, has this rather odd bifurcated system where a
treaty can be one or the other.
What does the doctrine mean? Well, here we get into very deep
water, and I'll just introduce the subject. In the area of judicial consider-
ation, a treaty is self-executing when the court can and must use it as a
rule of decision. Non-self-executing treaties then are not applied that
way, and the court will defer any decision to the legislature. This appears
to be true at least with respect to the effect of treaties on state law and
whether they can be invoked by private parties.
Beyond that it is less clear exactly what the doctrine means. Can,
for example, the principles and doctrines of a non-self-executing treaty
be used to interpret pre-existing statutes? Can they be referred to as nor-
mative guidelines by the courts? Can they inform decisions based on cus-
tomary international law? Here, the Australian system has recently had
an interesting development where the High Court said that a treaty is a
positive statement by the executive government. The Court further said it
would act in accordance with that treaty, and give rise to the legitimate
expectation that administrative decision-makers will act in conformity
with that treaty. This provoked a legislative response from the govern-
ment saying that in fact this was not true. And perhaps we can hear more
about that debate.
Finally, when is a treaty self-executing? This is a controversial ques-
tion. There are those, and I'm one of them, who say it's a matter for the
executive branch, or at least for the executive and the legislature. When
we enter into a treaty, and the President transmits it to the Senate and
declares that it will be a non-self-executing treaty, that ought to be deter-
minative. Certainly when the Senate conditions its advice and consent on
that same understanding, that combination ought to bind the courts.
Then there are those who would say that is just the view of the po-
litical branches, that the doctrine is in fact a judicial doctrine rooted in
the Constitution, so a court can have a different view. There are even
some who think that the Constitution favors self-executing treaties, that
in fact all treaties are self-executing unless you can prove that they
14. GRUNDESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.).
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aren't. There are those who believe that treaties that obligate the Govern-
ment to refrain from an action, not to torture for example, are de facto,
self-executing treaties. There are those who would also say that even in
the case of a non-self-executing treaty, the Government has the obliga-
tion to implement the treaty.
The question of self-executing versus non-self-executing also arises
but with less force in the case of executive agreements. There are clearly
executive agreements that can be self-executing, and here Dames &
Moore5 is the relevant case to cite.
MS. GARZA: Thank you, Mr. Stewart. That was a very good over-
view of the Government's perspective on this issue. Next, we have Pro-
fessor Hurst Hannum.
MR. HANNUM: I would like to put the labor agreements and
human rights that are at issue here into a larger context.
I've had the pleasure of serving on other panels with David Stewart,
and this time I can say that I agree with almost everything that he said.
He has given you a very good overview of the status of international law
in general and treaties, in particular, within U.S. domestic law.
What I would like to do is to focus on the last issue that he raised,
that of the self-executing treaty, which is peculiar to U.S. law. Compar-
ing the situations in Canada and Mexico, we will undoubtedly end up
with very different views of the roles that treaties should play in domes-
tic law and the role that, in fact, they do play.
As Mr. Stewart mentioned, the distinction in U.S. law between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties is one that was created by the
judicial branch. It does not appear in the Constitution, which says simply
that treaties, along with federal laws, are the supreme law of the land. It
wasn't until 1829, 40 years after our Constitution was adopted, that Chief
Justice Marshall invented the distinction, 16 and it has remained an ex-
tremely controversial and difficult issue ever since. I would suggest that,
in effect, the Constitution has been amended through political develop-
ments that have removed treaties from their position as equal to federal
law and essentially placed them in an inferior position. The assumption
that Mr. Stewart mentioned - that treaties are not self-executing - has be-
come the political reality in the United States, even though I believe that
such a position is legally unjustified.
The real question is when a treaty is self-executing and when it is
not. Perhaps the best I can do to sow as much confusion as possible, but
also to give you a realistic view of the situation, is to read from three of
15. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
16. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
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the most important U.S. cases that have attempted to tell us which is
which.
The first is the original formulation by Chief Justice Marshall in
1829 in Foster v. Nielsen, in which he said, "our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature wherever it op-
erates by itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties en-
gages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the politi-
cal, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the con-
tract before it can become a rule for the Court."1 7
This formulation is absolutely incomprehensible, as demonstrated by
the fact that Chief Justice Marshall initially found that the treaty was
non-self-executing. Four years later, in examining exactly the same
treaty, he decided that he had been mistaken; in fact, the treaty was self-
executing and, therefore, did operate directly. That kind of confusion has
continued.
Probably the two best-reasoned cases are somewhat more recent,
and let me mention briefly the tests that they suggested for determining
whether or not a treaty is self-executing. The first is a Circuit Court case
from 1974, People of Saipan v. the Department of the Interior,8 which
identified four factors that one should look at to determine self-executing
treaties: first, the purpose of the treaty and the objectives of its creators;
second, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate
for direct implementation; third, the availability and feasibility of alterna-
tive enforcement methods; and fourth, the immediate and long-range con-
sequences of determining that the treaty is self-executing or non-self-
executing.
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit, in the case of Frolova v. Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics,19 came up with six factors, at least some of
which are similar to those in People of Saipan:20 first, the language and
purpose of the agreement as a whole; second, the circumstances sur-
rounding its execution; third, the nature of the obligations imposed by the
agreement; fourth, the availability of alternative enforcement mecha-
nisms; fifth, the implications, presumably for the court, if one permitted a
private right of action to grow out of the treaty; and finally, the capacity
of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.
17. Id. at 314.
18. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
19. 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
20. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
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These factors may help us a little bit. However, at least one proba-
bly isn't of much help, and that is the reference to the expectations of
those who drafted the treaty. In drafting any multilateral treaty, there is
simply no expectation on the part of the drafters as to what the domestic
effect of that treaty will be. As Mr. Stewart observed, in civil law coun-
tries, treaties are generally considered self-executing, whereas in common
law countries the reverse is true. The only expectation is that each party
will apply the rule found in its own legal system.
It seems to me that, given the peculiar U.S. Constitutional directive,
which is quite different from the law of the United Kingdom and Austra-
lia, one should be begin with the presumption that treaties are self-
executing. This has been suggested by some recent U.S. cases, although
it's probably fair to say that this is true only with respect to some trea-
ties. I thought it might be interesting to give you a sense of the kinds of
treaties that have been found to be self-executing in the U.S. and those
not found to be self-executing.
Bilateral treaties concerned with Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion ("the FCN Treaties"), have been generally found by U.S. courts to
be self-executing. That is, where the provision is essentially one of non-
discrimination between foreigners and U.S. citizens, the courts have as-
sumed self-execution without serious consideration of the issue.
Extradition treaties have also been considered, without much discus-
sion, to be self-executing, although one should at least parenthetically
mention the case of U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain.21 Here, the Supreme Court
demonstrated its political (if not its legal) view towards international law
by allowing a suspect to remain in custody in the United States, even
though he was kidnapped by U.S. Government officials from Mexico in
clear violation of international law.
Among other treaties normally thought to be self-executing are those
which deal with what might be called "procedural" details of interna-
tional relations. These would include, for example, the treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and the
Netherlands, 22 the U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods,23 and the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Ju-
dicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. 24
21. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
22. 22 I.L.M. 1414 (1983) (signed at The Hague, June 12, 1981).
23. U.S. Neth., 19 I.L.M. 668, (1980) (adopted by the Conference April 10, 1980,
opened for signature April 11, 1980).
24. Done at The Hague, Nov. 15, 1965, entered into force Feb. 10, 1969, T.I.A.S.
6638, 24 I.L.M. 1746 (1985).
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All of these have been considered to be self-executing, again often with-
out much discussion.
Treaties can be partially self-executing and partially non-self-
executing. One example of this is the Chicago Convention on Civil Avia-
tion,25 which includes a provision relating to non-discrimination in land-
ing fees that foreign carriers are obliged to pay and also contains provi-
sions on the reasonableness of those landing fees. Several U.S. courts
have addressed those provisions, with one court finding that the discrimi-
nation provisions were self-executing and could therefore be invoked by
a private party where discrimination was alleged. More recently, another
court determined that the reasonableness provisions were not self-
executing, because they weren't sufficiently precise to give the court an
issue with which it could deal.
Notably missing from this list are human rights treaties or broad
multilateral treaties with a larger political purpose. However, one district
court, in a case involving General Noriega after he had been arrested by
the United States, held rather specifically that the third Geneva Conven-
tion of 194926 (which applies to prisoners of war) was self-executing and
did apply to Noriega.27 This case was appealed but was decided on other
grounds, 28 and this particular issue, to the best of my knowledge, was not
re-litigated.
Other courts that have addressed the issue of the Geneva Conven-
tions have found them not to be self-executing, which has been the fate
of most general multilateral treaties. The United Nations Charter,29 the
Charter of the Organization of American States, a0 the Geneva Convention
on the High Seas,3 the 1907 Hague Convention regarding land warfare,32
the Refugee Convention and Protocol, 33 and finally, the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,3 4 only ratified relatively recently by the United
25. Done at Chicago, Dec. 7, 1944, entered into force April 4, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1591,
18 I.L.M. 542 (1979).
26. Third Geneva Convention of 1949, done at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950, T.I.A.S. 3364, 15 I.L.M. 1236 (1976).
27. U.S. v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
28. U.S. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
29. Signed at San Francisco, Jun. 26, 1945, T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031.
30. Signed at Bogota, Apr. 10, 1948, T.I.A.S. 2361.
31. 1958, T.I.A.S. 5200, 13 U.S.T. 2312.
32. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The
Hague, Oct. 18, 1907; 36 Stat. 2277; T.S. 539.
33. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva, July 28, 1951;
T.I.A.S. 6577. See also, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York,
Jan. 31, 1967; T.I.A.S. 6577; 19 U.S.T. 6223.
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York, Dec.
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States, 35 have all been found by the courts to be non-self-executing.
In many cases, this has been done without much discussion or
thought. In some cases, at least, it has been based on the view expressed
by Mr. Stewart that the intention of the executive branch or the legisla-
tive branch should be controlling. Indeed, in the recent case involving the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the court said not only that the
treaty provision in question was so brief and at a level of such generality
as to be meaningless, which might or might not be true, but it went on to
say that the declaration that the treaty was non-self-executing added by
the U.S. Senate was dispositive of the issue and that therefore the court
could not look any farther.36
It has become the practice of the United States, as also indicated by
Mr. Stewart, to include a declaration of non-self-executing effect to every
human rights treaty ratified in recent years. This appears to be due to a
shift from the principle that federally adopted laws and treaties are equal,
as stated in our Constitution, to a position that federal laws should be
given more weight than treaties and that somehow it is inappropriate and
politically too difficult to adopt binding federal legislation through the
treaty process - even though that process is specified with great clarity in
the Constitution.
As a result, it has become extremely difficult for courts to find that
treaties are self-executing, even when their terms would appear to be
quite clear. In a recent case, the a U.S. Court of Appeals looked to the
Department of Defense interpretation that a particular recruitment and
employment contract between the U.S. and the Philippines was non-self-
executing, and concluded simply, if this is the Government's view, then
it must be right.3 7 This may be a reasonable position, but it unfortunately
distorts not only the original intent and the clear wording of the
Constitution.
Finally, there should be a distinction made (and some courts have
made it) between the fact that a treaty may be directly effective in the
United States and therefore self-executing in that respect but still not cre-
ate a private right of action. This was the position that the Supreme
Court adopted fairly recently, in a case in which the plaintiff was the
Government of Paraguay, not a private citizen.38 The court first found the
16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; 36 I.L.M. 228; (1997).
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force for the
United States Sept. 8, 1992; 36 I.L.M. 228 (1992).
36. Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 97-3093
DRD, 1998 WL 684473, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 1998).
37. More v. Intelcom Support Services, Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 472 (5th Cir. 1992).
38. Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
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provision in question in this particular treaty was clear. Therefore, since
Paraguay was a party, it had a right to bring a case alleging violation of
the treaty in United States courts, even though no private party would
have an equivalent right. Perhaps the treaty was therefore only half self-
executing.
Since I am not an expert in international labor law, I thought that it
might be of some interest to look at ILO Convention 87, which is after
all the reason that we're all here, and to give you my opinion as to
whether it would be considered to be self-executing in the United States.
My answer is partly yes and partly no.
The partly yes answer is derived from the first article in the conven-
tion, which says that "each member which ratifies the convention under-
takes to give effect to the following provisions." It then lists provisions
that are relatively specific, that do not require any additional implement-
ing legislation, and that therefore could and should be applied directly by
the U.S. courts.
There are two articles, however, which are clearly non-self-
executing, and I think they demonstrate very well the difference between
the two kinds of provisions. The first is Article 9, which says that the
extent to which the convention will apply to the armed forces and the
police "shall be determined by national law or regulation." Clearly, this
is the sort of provision that requires subsequent legislative action before
it can have any effect, and therefore it would be non-self-executing.
The other is Article 11, which deals with the right to organize. Here,
the obligation that States undertake is quite different from the obligation
they assume in Article 1. In Article 11, States agree to take all necessary
and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may ex-
ercise freely the right to organize. There obviously is an assumption that
what is appropriate and necessary will be determined later by the appro-
priate domestic authorities, and therefore a U.S. court would not be able
to enforce this provision directly.
I believe that treaties should have a much higher legal status in the
United States than they do, but our discussions can't and shouldn't sepa-
rate law from politics. I think that it's fair to look back at the United
States Government over the last twenty years in all its aspects - judicial,
legislative, executive - and to see whether or not the United States ap-
pears to be a country in which international law is generally respected,
given deference to, felt to be important. With very rare exceptions, one
of them the case involving the Palestine Liberation Organization men-
tioned by Mr. Stewart,39 the answer to that question is no. In general, in-
39. U.S. v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 ESupp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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ternational law is viewed by both the political branches and the judicial
branches as something that may be useful only if it is consistent with
what the United States is already doing.
It may not be surprising that the courts are reluctant to look to inter-
national law for a rule of decision that overturns domestic law. Nonethe-
less, I think that, until there is a change in the political as well as the le-
gal climate in this country, courts are unlikely to look very often to
international law in any form to identify or even to interpret norms that
are essential for protecting the human rights and the labor rights of U.S.
citizens.
MS. GARZA: Thank you, Professor Hannum, for that presentation
on self-executing versus non-self-executing treaties and your candid opin-
ion on the U.S. position versus international law. Next we have Professor
Ben Aaron.
MR. AARON: My presentation regards the ILO and the conventions
that we have or have not ratified and why. But my experience is that a
great many people do not know very much about the ILO, so I'd like to
start with just a word about the structure and function of the ILO.
It was created, as I'm sure most of you know, as part of the Treaty
of Versailles, and the preamble to its constitution states in part that uni-
versal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social
justice and also that the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions
.of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to im-
prove the conditions in their own countries.
That last statement is relevant today when we are discussing with
other countries whether to add certain human rights protections to our in-
ternational trade agreements. The ILO is composed of a yearly general
assembly, which is called the International Labor Conference, an execu-
tive council, which is called the Governing Body, and a permanent staff,
which is called the International Labor Office. The organization also
works through a wide variety of subsidiary bodies, such as regional con-
ferences, industrial committees, and meetings of experts.
Two of the principal functions of the ILO are setting international
standards and supervising their observance. Standards emerge from the
International Labor Conference in the form of conventions or recommen-
dations. The conventions are similar to international treaties and are sub-
ject to ratification. When a member ratifies a convention, it is obligated
to bring national legislation and practice into conformity with its terms
and provisions. Recommendations do not require ratification. They are
intended to serve as guidelines for national policy in given fields.
Together the conventions and the recommendations comprise the In-
ternational Labor Code that serves as a model and stimulus for national
legislation and practice in member countries. It is particularly important
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for Third World countries that have no other point of reference for their
labor standards and who depend very heavily upon advice and technical
support from the ILO.
Two ILO bodies share primary responsibility for supervising the
way governments carry out their obligations under ratified conventions.
First, an independent Committee of Experts on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations, composed of twenty members, makes
observations or requests for specific information on a totally independent
basis. The Committee's terms of reference do not require it to give for-
mal interpretations of conventions because competence to do that is
vested in the International Court of Justice. Nevertheless, in order to
carry out its function of evaluating the implication of implementation of
the conventions, the committee has to consider and express its views on
the meanings of certain provisions of the conventions. Second, after the
initial evaluation by the experts, a more general review is made at the In-
ternational Labor Conference by a tripartite committee on the application
of conventions and recommendations.
In addition, the ILO constitution permits two special procedures for
investigating non-compliance with a ratified convention in a given coun-
try. First, employer or worker organizations can submit representation to
the ILO governing body alleging a failure to comply. This representation
is then examined by a three-member team and may be communicated to
the government concerned for comment, and if the member government
fails to respond effectively, then the governing body can publish the rep-
resentation and the government's comments.
Second, a conference delegate or a state that has ratified a particular
convention can file a complaint with the governing body. The complaint
may be referred to an independent three-member commission of inquiry,
which may take evidence from witnesses and conduct on-site inquiries.
Results of the investigation and the commission's recommendations are
published in a report.
You notice that there's no machinery actually to enforce any of this,
but the reports of these committees carry with them a great deal of moral
suasion. Countries do not like to be subject to these procedures, and they
take very seriously the efforts of the committees to try to resolve them
and to avoid the necessity of publishing reports which indicate some re-
luctance on the part of the allegedly offending country to comply with
the law.
The ILO established special machinery in the field of freedom of as-
sociation for trade union purposes in 1950. It is based on the submission
of complaints by governments or by employers' or workers' organiza-
tions. Complaints under this procedure may be made even against states
that have not ratified Convention 87, Freedom of Association and Protec-
[Vol. 22
1998] INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS 241
tion of the Right to Organize, or Convention 98, Right to Organize and
to Bargain Collectively, and other basic conventions.
Because the ILO constitution lays down the principle of freedom of
association, it has been held that this principle should be observed by
members by virtue of their membership in the organization alone,
whether or not they have ratified it. Although member states cannot be
compelled to observe the more detailed standards of ILO conventions
that they haven't ratified, the ILO considers it is entitle to promote the
implementation of this constitutional principle by means such as investi-
gation and conciliation. So, for example, the United States, if accused of
violating Convention 87, even though it hasn't ratified it, may have to
submit to formal inquiries and make responses simply to clarify the situ-
ation even though it cannot be compelled to formally articulate and ratify
the specific provisions of the convention.
One of the principle instrumentalities established in this field is the
Tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association, which consists of nine
members. The reports of the Committee are made to the governing body
of the ILO. They contain the findings of the Committee on the cases
submitted to it and, where appropriate, recommendations to the govern-
ments concerned.
The Committee, in over 1,500 cases since its inception, has estab-
lished a body of case law. Faced with a wide variety of situations, the
Committee, while relying at the outset on the general standards laid
down in the ILO conventions concerning freedom of association, was
gradually led to frame principles defining more closely and in some re-
spects supplementing and even extending those expressly embodied in
conventions. These principles refer in particular to the right to strike, col-
lective bargaining, and related civil liberties.
To promote the flexibility in the ratification of conventions, numer-
ous possibilities have been afforded ratifying states. They can ratify only
certain parts of an instrument, choosing from a number of provisions lay-
ing down different obligations, excluding certain groups of workers from
the scope of an instrument, making temporary exceptions, and so forth.
And the Labor Conference has also sought to make certain provisions
less rigid by introducing such modifiers as "where necessary" and "ap-
propriate circumstances" and so forth.
In some areas, however, there is no room for flexibility. The ILO
view is that international standards must be intransigent when they are a
matter of fundamental rights, such as freedom of association, the aboli-
tion of forced labor, or elimination of discrimination. Also, the practice
of ratifying a convention with reservations has never been permitted by
the ILO. On the other hand, conventions may be ratified subject to cer-
tain understandings as to the meaning of a specific term.
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Now, as far as the U.S. participation in the ILO is concerned, the
United States joined the ILO in 1934 and withdrew in 1977 because of
certain policy disputes. The U.S. rejoined in 1980, and throughout the
entire period since 1934, the U.S. has ratified only 11 conventions, seven
of which deal with maritime matters.
Constitutional Considerations
Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." The United States has adopted the "monist"
theory of international law:
Monists view international and domestic law as together constituting a
single legal system. Each country's legislature is bound to respect inter-
national law in enacting its legislation. The national executive is obliged
to take care that international law be faithfully executed. Domestic courts
must give effect to international law, anything in the domestic constitu-
tion or laws to the contrary notwithstanding. 40
As early as 1829, however, the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. 41 The Court declared
that if a treaty contains a promise by the United States to do something
that only the political branches can do (e.g., pass an implementing law),
then by hypothesis the courts cannot give effect to that treaty. On the
other hand, the courts can and will give effect to such treaty after the po-
litical branches have acted or if the United States effectively fulfilled the
promised act before the treaty was concluded. 42
Many provisions of ILO Conventions are self-executing and require
supplementary laws or regulations for their application. This is true, in
particular, of the so-called promotional Conventions, which lay down
"programatic" standards that cannot give rise directly to individual
rights, but consist of a general description of objectives and represent
programs for action by governments which may be carried out by differ-
ent methods and over a period of time.
Two of the so-called cornerstone ILO Conventions, 87 and 98,
neither of which has been ratified by the United States, have been cited
40. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its "Progeny," 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987).
41. See Foster & Elam v. Nielsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
42. See Henkin, supra note 40, at 866 n.65. See also E. LANDY, THE EFFECnVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THRTY YEARS OF lEO EXPERIENCE 103 (1966).
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as examples of what would be non-self-executing and self-executing trea-
ties, respectively, if they were to be ratified. Thus, 87 provides that a rat-
ifying State "undertakes to give effect" to its provisions, whereas 98
contains no equivalent implementation language and affirmatively estab-
lishes standards relative to the right to organize and to bargain
collectively.43
So far as the discharge of international obligations by States ratify-
ing ILO Conventions is concerned, however, the Committee of Experts
has pointed out that mere incorporation into national law of ratified Con-
ventions whose provisions are not self-executing does not discharge the
international obligations of the ratifying States.44
Another aspect of U.S. law that must be noted is the doctrine that
subsequent laws supersede a prior treaty if its terms are incompatible
with the more recent legislation.
Problems with Federal States, such as the United States
A federal State, in this context, is not only a country composed of
units (e.g., states) enjoying a degree of self-government, but one in
which the power to give effect to ILO Conventions lies to some extent at
least with these constituent units rather than with the central (federal)
government. Thus, for example, the primacy, with some exceptions, of
federal labor relations law in the private sector in the United States must
be contrasted with the lack of federal jurisdiction in most areas of labor
relations in the states' public sector. Obviously, it is impracticable to sub-
mit a convention to each of the 50 states for ratification; yet if the fed-
eral government is not exclusively or even primarily responsible for giv-
ing effect to a particular Convention, action by several states constitutes
the only acceptable alternative.
Policy debate over Convention Ratifications by the United States
The next subject is the policy debate over convention ratification by
the U.S. And in doing this I'm going to refer to some specific hearings
held before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources in
1985.41 I'm doing this so I can lay out more clearly exactly what the re-
43. See generally E. PoTrER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - THE IMPACT ON U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE OF RATIFICATION
OF ILO CONVENTIONS No. 87 & No. 98 (1984).
44. See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS REPORT 8-12 (1963); COMMFITEE OF EXPERTS RE-
PORT 8 (1970).
45. See Examination of the Relationship Between the United States and the Interna-
tional Labor Organization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 99th Cong. 1 (1985).
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spective positions of the interested parties are.
The chairman of the committee introduced the subject by raising
two questions. First, what is the feasibility of U.S. ratification of ILO la-
bor conventions without creating a detrimental effect on U.S. labor law?
And second, is there any linkage between the U.S. ratification history
and our country's influence within the ILO?
The principal witnesses were the then Secretary of State George P.
Schultz; the Secretary of Labor William E. Brock; Lane Kirkland, then
President of AFL-CIO; and Abraham Katz, President of the U.S. Council
for International Business.
Secretary Schultz declared that the failure of the U.S. to ratify any
but the maritime ILO conventions conflicts with the obligations we as-
sumed when we joined the ILO.46 Noting that the ILO's purpose was to
raise labor standards around the globe through the process of adoption
and ratification of conventions, 47 he pointed out that "every member state
has a moral obligation to make a good faith effort to determine whether
it can ratify conventions. ' 48 But, he observed, "our behavior sends a
message that ILO procedures do not apply to us." 49
Schultz also pointed out the inconsistency between our failure to
consider ratification of ILO conventions and the growing tendency in the
congress to refer to internationally recognized workers' rights standards
regarding freedom of association and forced labor in the U.S. trade and
aid legislation.50 He concluded that the U.S. should correct its approach
and be more flexible and consider individual conventions on their own
merits rather than continue to make a priori judgements that only mari-
time conventions are suitable for the United States to ratify.5'
Secretary Brock argued that the low number of U.S. ratifications of
ILO conventions is attributable mainly to our federal system of govern-
ment.5 2 "Most conventions," he explained, "would require legislative ac-
tion by the constituent states as well as or instead of the federal govern-
ment, and the United States cannot assume treaty obligations under a
convention which might fall wholly or in part within state jurisdiction. '5 3
46. See id. at 9.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Examination of the Relationship Between the United States and the International
Labor Organization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
99th Cong. at 9, (1985).
52. See id. at 21.
53. Id.
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Well, I associate myself with the views of Secretary Schultz. I think
then Secretary Brock wasn't entirely right in his labor law understanding,
and I think that most of the treaties that we could be considering would
not have to be ratified by the states.
Lane Kirkland, whose organization had not shown any tremendous
interest in ILO conventions up to that time, termed the U.S. ratification
record "deplorable," noting that of the countries with comparable years
of ILO membership only one, El Salvador, had fewer ratifications than
does the United States.54 Of more critical importance, he continued, "is
the fact that a nation that prides and proclaims itself as a champion of
human rights has ratified none of the basic human rights conventions. '55
Kirkland insisted that federal structure is not the real reason for our non-
ratification record.56 Rather, he said, "it stems from the resistance in the
past by employer organizations because ratification would involve a su-
pervisory scrutiny of our democratic laws and practices and involve some
of our domestic labor standards. '57
Abraham Katz stressed two points. First, that modification of U.S.
labor law through ratification of ILO conventions that differ from U.S.
law would amount to a complete divestiture by Congress to the ILO of
its delegated power to establish labor policy.58 Second, that on broader
policy grounds the business community remains opposed to ratification of
ILO conventions because it is concerned that any ratification will be per-
ceived by the ILO community as ending the longstanding U.S. policy of
not ratifying non-maritime ILO conventions.5 9 The argument seems to be
something of a non sequitur, but in any event, that is the position.
To ratify non-maritime conventions, he continued, would be sending
the wrong signal to the ILO community, because he did not believe that
there were many of those conventions that the U.S. would be able to rat-
ify.6° Moreover, ratification of conventions with which our law is at vari-
ance would, he said, "present an opportunity that does not now exist for
our critics to criticize the United States." '61
54. See id. at 42.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 43.
57. Examination of the Relationship Between the United States and the International
Labor Organization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
99th Cong. at 43 (1985).
58. See id. at 77.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
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Well, what is this fight all about? The fight really boils down to a
question of sovereignty. The views of the business group, which have
been very forcefully and ably presented by its general counsel, Mr. Pot-
ter, really boil down to this: we continue to have a solipsistic view of the
universe insofar as our laws, and particularly our labor laws, are con-
cerned. We think that our laws set the standard and that everything else
is irrelevant; we do not like the idea that we could be wrong, that there
may be other ideas out there, other practices, other procedures which are
really better and fairer than ours; we don't want to risk the possibility
that these views will be brought to the attention of the American public,
and therefore, the simplest thing is to say, well, we're not going to ratify
any of these conventions. I submit that is not the position that the United
States, or any country, ought to be taking. I think we would do much
better to tone down the rhetoric and simply, quietly agree to take a new
look at all of these conventions and to ask ourselves whether we might
be wrong and somebody else might be right; and, finally, that we can
adopt some of these new conventions or old conventions without destroy-
ing the foundation stones of the republic.
Unfortunately, the position as it remains today is simply that we will
consider ratification of any convention with which we already in effect
comply and will not consider the possibility of ratifying conventions
which are non-self-executing and require us to adopt some legislative re-
sponse, either by modifying existing legislation or introducing some new
legislation. I hope that in time we will retreat from that position. I wish I
could say that I see it in the near future. Unfortunately, I do not.
MS. GARZA: Thank you, Professor, for your comments, in particu-
lar for talking to us about the structure of the ILO, and you mentioned
that there's no enforcement mechanism and that basically there's a reli-
ance on moral suasion. And as you know, this is the same provision of
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation when it comes to
freedom of association issues.
I also appreciate your views on the U.S. position and why we as a
country have ratified very few conventions. This is an issue that's often
raised by my counterparts here, and I don't always have the answers, so
I'm glad that Professor Aaron is here to answer those types of questions.
The following presentation will be made by the Mexico delegation. The
first panelist is Dr. Javier Moctezuma Barragan.
PRESENTATION BY THE MEXICAN DELEGATION
DR. MOCTEZUMA: In regard to the legal treatment of treaties, in-
ternational treaties, and the relationship between treaties and federal law,
we can say that our treatment is somewhat similar to that in the United
States. From a simple reading of our constitutional text one can see in
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Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution and Article 6 of the U.S. Consti-
tution, they show some similarities.
Our legal systems have evolved, however, in different directions.
Here today we're in a splendid building, a historical building, and both
of our countries, both of our legal systems is also built on a historical
foundation. All three of our countries are federal systems with states and
provinces. There's a division of powers, democracy is in place, and we
all believe in international peace and cooperation. We have all built our
structures, our constitutions with the same building material, so to say.
However, there are major differences that need to be discussed. As I
said, in appearance it would seem that these structures are similar; how-
ever, the blueprints might be a bit different. They were designed and
drawn by different architects, if you will. In the United States at that
time, things went in a different direction. We know that in 1788, Luther
Martin, a renowned Marylander, even wrote about such matters.
But anyway, things have gone in different directions. The buildings
have gone up differently. Their foundation, the ground they were built on
was different, so to say. Mexico is a civil law country while the United
States is a common law country. And that makes us examine the differ-
ences that may exist and how international treaties and constitutional sys-
tems are different in Mexican. Article 133 of the Constitution of Mexico
states the following, and I will read from our Constitution:
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress that emanate from it,
and all treaties that are in agreement with it which are signed or
shall be signed by the President with the approval of a Congress
will be the supreme law of the land. The judges will rule in ac-
cordance with these laws in spite of any provisions contrary to
them that may exist in the individual provinces or states. 62
So, as we see from this precept, the supreme law of the land in Mexico
is the constitution, laws passed by the congress of the land, and all trea-
ties that are signed and that are in agreement with them.
But there is a certain hierarchy among these various provisions in
our country. The beginning of Article 133 seems to say that supreme law
of the land will not only be the Constitution but any law that emanates
from the congress and from the international treaties that are signed by
the President with the approval of the Senate. However, in spite of that
declaration, law passed by the congress and the aforementioned interna-
tional treaties are subjected to the provision that they not run contrary to
the Constitution. The hegemony of the Constitution over and above con-
62. MEX. CONST. art. 133.
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gressional laws and treaties is in agreement with Article 15 of our Con-
stitution. Article 15 says that no other law or treaty can go against the
Constitution of the land. 63 Therefore, there is no doubt about the
supremacy of our Constitution. That has also been established by the Su-
preme Court of Mexico.
As you know, there are different views of doctrine regarding the re-
lationship between domestic and international law. This is a practical
problem, especially when one ratifies a convention or a treaty and one
has international obligations to enact such a treaty or convention. Thus,
Bartosky and Bartolome de la Cruz coined out that there are two basic
doctrines in this regard: a monistic and a dualistic one.
In the former, the monistic view, there is no illegal separation be-
tween international law and domestic law, and thus, treaties such as ILO
Conventions, are automatically incorporated into the legislation of a
country. But the dualistic doctrine says that international law and domes-
tic law are two different orders of things, and once a treaty is ratified, it
must be formally incorporated into the law by the lawmakers, such as is
the case in Mexico.
In Mexico, we accept the dualistic doctrine, which says that for a
treaty to be incorporated into domestic law it must go through two
phases. First, the President of the Republic must sign the treaty or con-
vention. Second, the convention must be approved by the congress of the
country. And in both cases, Articles 15 and 133 of the Constitution must
be respected. These stipulate that the conventional treaty must be in ac-
cordance with the Constitution. 64
Article 15 is rooted in the principles consecrated in the 19th century
that prohibited slavery in Mexico, and so presence of a slave on our ter-
ritory would make him or her into a free person. Moreover, our Constitu-
tion says that no treaty may be held for the extradition of political pris-
oners or for any common prisoners or common criminals if they are to
be extradited to a country where they would be considered to be slaves. 65
Furthermore, a treaty must be published in the official State Bulletin
or Diary in accordance with Article IV of legislation on the international
treaties. 66 Thus, we can see that treaties are subordinated to the Constitu-
63. MEX. CONST. art. 15. "No treaty shall be authorized for the expatriation of polit-
ical offenders or for offenders of common opinion who have been slaves in the country
where the offense was committed. Nor shall any agreement or treaty be entered into
which restricts or modifies the guarantees and rights which this constitution grants to the
individual and to the citizen."
64. See id..
65. See MEx. CONST. art. 15.
66. See MEX. CONST. art. 4.
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tion of Mexico. However, as is also the case in other countries with simi-
lar systems, we find some legal uncertainty after a treaty is signed if a
law is passed that has provisions that go contrary to the treaty. And let
me go into this to throw some light on what needs to be known or done
specifically in regard to Mexico here.
Once we see the subordination of a treaty to the Constitution, we
need to clarify about whether any legislation should be subordinated to
an enacted treaty. This would mean that administrative or jurisdictional
authorities, according to the case, would find themselves in a position to
choose one or the other. In other words, a decision would have to be
made between subordination or incorporation. The initial solution would
be to base this on principles of legal hermeneutics. That is very clear.
That is to say that any older provision is eliminated by a newer and
higher level provision.
However, if it's a question of a treaty or a convention and federal
law, that is no longer possible because they are enacted or created in a
very different way. In effect, a law or an amendment to a law must go
through the processes laid out in Articles 61 and 62 of the Constitution.67
In other words, publication of a bill, debate, and approval by the legisla-
tion and signed by the Executive.
However, a convention or treaty goes through a different process in
order to become part of our national legislation or law. First of all, it
must be signed by the President and then approved by one of the two
chambers of our congress, namely by the Senate. Article 133 of the Con-
stitution states this.68 So, from that Article we can see that treaties as
well as any regulations approved under the Constitution are put at the
same hierarchical level just under the Constitutional level. The Constitu-
tion says nothing about subordination of treaty law to congressionally-
passed law. Thus, the two are held at an equal level. Cases have gone to
our Supreme Court in Mexico on this as I will now show you.
This is a national law, and treaties have the same level or hierarchy.
And in the decision that I am looking at, this is PC 91, page 27 of Book
67. See MEx. CONST. art. 61. "Deputies and Senators are invoidable for opinions ex-
pressed by them in the discharge of their offices and shall never be called to account for
them. The president of each chamber shall see that the constitutional privilege of the
member thereof is respected and that the premises where their meetings take place are not
violated." See also MEX. CONST. art. 62.
68. See MEX. CONST. art. 133. "This constitution, the laws of the Congress of the
Union which emanate therefrom, and all treaties made, or which shall be made in accor-
dance therewith by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Senate, shall be
the Supreme law throughout the Union. The judge of every state shall be bound to said
constitution, the laws and treaties, notwithstanding any contradictory provisions that may
appear in the constitution of laws of the states."
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20. The Supreme Court says, "Given that a treaty has the same hierar-
chy, that is not a criteria for the Constitutionality of law or vice versa."
So thus, it's relevant to point out that the decisions emanating from these
cases before a Supreme Court are based on the principle of the relativity
of the Amparo provisions under Article 68 of the Amparo Law. 69 In
Mexico, this principle is only applied to the specific cases examined by
the Supreme Court.
According to Article 124 of the Constitution, there must be express
definition in the Constitution when passing legislation.70 In other words,
there are certain Constitutional provisions in Article 63 of the Constitu-
tion that rule on this question, and anything that isn't reserved for the
federal authorities is considered to be the authority of the states in Mex-
ico.71 But since there is no norm that says treaties are to be put above the
law passed by the congress, nor is there any legal provision that estab-
lishes that treaties must be in harmony with such law, it is possible for
them to be or not to be in harmony with such a law. And in that case,
the principle of a newer law replacing an older law does not necessarily
come into effect.
Thus, it can be concluded that in elaborating a law within the con-
gress, treaties and conventions signed by Mexico must be taken into con-
sideration in order to ensure consistency. If not, two possibilities exist.
One would be that we would have to amend the law to bring it into line
with a convention. Alternatively, if amendments are not made to the law,
a treaty would have to be renounced and eliminated. That possibility is
rarely used by any state. If treaty is self-executing, then the state has a
responsibility to other states as well as a responsibility to people within
the country to balance the treaty and local law.
In closing, we can reach the following four conclusions. First of all,
in Mexico we live in a strict legal system in which the Constitution is
the full manifestation of national sovereignty and therefore, any legal
norms emanating from the Constitution are fully subordinated to the
Constitution or higher law, including national law and treaties.
Secondly, the legal nature of federal law and treaties and conven-
tions is different in our country since for the reform or amendment of a
law, a full process that is established by the Constitution must be carried
out. However, to incorporate a treaty or convention into our national leg-
islation, it must be signed by the executive branch and then be approved
by the Senate of the country. Moreover, to leave a convention, there is a
69. MEX. CONsT. art. 68.
70. MEX. CONST. art. 124. "The powers not expressly granted by the constitution to
federal officials are understood to be reserved to the states."
71. See generally, MEX. CONST. art. 63.
[Vol. 22
1998] INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS251
special process laid out in international law that is different than what we
have for actually passing law in the country.
Third, according to the decision handed down by the Supreme
Court, Article 133 of our Constitution says that national law and treaties
have the same hierarchy just under the rank of Constitutional law. More-
over, national law cannot be used to determine Constitutionality of a law
or vice versa. Additionally, there is no greater obligation under a treaty
than under national law.
Fourth, decisions of the Supreme Court have effect only for the par-
ties directly involved in the trial with no ergo homines effects. Therefore,
the decision is not generally applicable but only for the specific case on
trial.
MS. GARZA: Thank you very much for your comments. It's inter-
esting to note that at the opening I mentioned that there were two Su-
preme Court decisions in Mexico that found a state statute unconstitu-
tional because it limited the number of unions per workplace to one, and
I think Dr. Moctezuma has just said that it requires that those particular
decisions have impact only insofar as the parties before it and not have
effect on other parties that were not before the Supreme Court. Next we
have Dr. Manuel Gonzalez.
DR. GONZALEZ: My main ideas relate to the different structural
and Constitutional differences between Mexico and the United States, de-
spite the similarity of the words, especially focusing on Article 133 of
our Constitution related to Article 6 of the United States Constitution.
However, that Article should be related to two other articles, the content
of which Dr. Moctezuma has just mentioned. The first one would be Ar-
ticle 72, Section F, and the other would be Article 124.
Mexico is a country that has a codified legal system quite different
from U.S. common law which also includes common law in Canada. The
legislation has been the source by autonomasia, with respect to the appli-
cation of this legislation, it is stipulated that all administrative authorities
as well as judicial authorities must respect and implement in a mechani-
cal fashion the texts or wording of the law. In Mexico, tradition has been
that from the time that the constitutions that were drafted at the provin-
cial or state level it was prohibited for the judges and law enforcement to
suspend or interpret laws. Now, there is a law that forbids a judicial in-
terpretation of laws.
During the 19th century in Mexico, there was a process launched
before the courts having to do with "duda de ley" or "in the case of
doubt". In the case of doubt with regard to the interpretation of a partic-
ular law, the courts were compelled to present this text to the legislature
so that these parties could resolve any doubts that there may be in the in-
terpretation of said law. This precedent is now reflected in paragraph F
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of Article 72 in the Mexican Constitution in which any reform or repeal
of a law or federal resolutions or decrees must be undertaken in accor-
dance with the proceedings of the creation. 72 This standard establishes the
following law.
As far as the interpretation or the repeal of any laws or decrees, the
same criteria must be respected that was utilized in the formulation or
passing of those laws. So, it's determined that no law can be repealed or
subject to reform unless another law has been introduced that fulfills the
same procedures. The international treaties in Mexico have been consid-
ered laws whose application is restricted with regard to domestic law.
The said Constitution of Mexico gives the impression that it has been
created with the objective of implementing international law at the do-
mestic level.
As we can see, we see the Calvo Clause that was established in Ar-
ticle 27 of the Constitution, describes the absolute territorial coverage of
Mexican laws. 73 Mexico has always rejected the extraterritorial imple-
mentation of laws.
We find another example in the resolution - to the Constitution
that established freedom for slaves that enter Mexican borders from for-
eign countries. This was an immediate reaction to the Dred Scott deci-
sion of 1857. 74
All of this information provides historical background for this law.
Mexico adopted the federal system, taking as an original model, the sys-
tem that was created in the United States. However, for the past 150
years, the distribution of power at the federal level in Mexico is quite
different from the separation of powers in the United States. The history
of Mexico dictates this difference. In 1847, the conflicts between the fed-
eral government and the state governments in Mexico created a convic-
tion that the distribution of powers would be better served if the federa-
tion powers were explicitly included in the Constitution. The states
would have all other reserved powers. In other words, anything not ex-
pressly included in the Constitution falls to the state governments.
72. MEX. CONST. art. 72, para. F. "In the interpretation, amendment or repeal of
laws or decrees, the same procedure shall be followed as that established for their enact-
ment. Every bill or proposed decrees, the resolution of which does not pertain to one of
the chambers, shall be discussed successively in both the regulations on debate being ob-
served as to form, intervals of time and mode of procedure in discussions and voting."
73. MEx. CONST. art. 27, para. XIC. "Landowner affected by granting or restoring
commercial lands and waters to villages or who may be affected by future decisions,
shall have no right to ordinary legal recourse and cannot institute amparo proceedings."
74. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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The distribution of power in our country is really following more a
confederation model as opposed to a federation model of the United
States. Article 124 of the federal Constitution determines that the federal
powers or authorities should be expressly provided by the Constitution to
said authorities. 75 This has resulted in our Constitution undergoing hun-
dreds of reforms. On each occasion in which there is a doubt regarding
federal jurisdiction, the Constitution undergoes another reform.
In 1832, in a controversial Supreme Court case between the Mexi-
can federal government and the state of Oaxaca, the Court decided the
use of implicit authorities, as we call it, of the congress as a way of in-
terpreting the expansion of federal jurisdictions. This is a major case, and
I feel honored to be here at Maryland because Maryland really launched
in the United States this implicit authority or jurisdiction for the Govern-
ment of the United States in the case of M'Culloch v. Maryland.76
Even though our Constitution in Paragraph 30 of Article 163, simi-
lar terminology to proper and necessary clause of the U.S. Constitution,
this has become almost null and void in our country.77 It has lost juris-
diction vis a vis Article 124 that I've already mentioned. Therefore, the
judicial activity regarding the hierarchy of laws has been quite different
in its structure, in its system as opposed to the Anglo Saxon law. There
is no subordination in our country of local law as opposed to federal law.
The federation has its express authorities and jurisdiction and the states
have their reserved authorities. As far as I understand, maybe I'm in er-
ror, but it's very similar to the Canadian system. That is my
interpretation.
The Mexican Constitution, as I said, has undergone reform in order
to allow for these changes in jurisdiction between the states and the fed-
eral government. Following the model of the M'Culloch v. Maryland de-
cision, the international treaties that are included in Article 133 of the
Mexican Constitution has a different relevance regarding the U.S. percep-
tion as the 19th century in the case of Ex parte Coy regarding the U.S.
perception that was applied to an international treaty.78 We don't have
any equivalent to Ex parte Coy, and we will never be able to apply it be-
cause our Constitution forbids two things. First, it prohibits a judicial in-
75. See MEx. CONST. art. 124.
76. 17 U.S. 316, 380 (1819).
77. See MEX. CONST. art. 73, para. 30.
78. Ex parte Coy, 32 F. 911, 916 (1887). In discussing which law, local or federal,
shall govern the court stated that "this government has entered into solemn treaty stipula-
tions with Mexico with reference to refugees from justice. These stipulations are, by a
declaration of the Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of the land, state
constitutions and laws to the contrary nothwithstanding."
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terpretation on that scale. Secondly, it prohibits the local laws, state laws,
and federal laws from undergoing reforms via international treaties.
The Supreme Court in Mexico and legislative branch have not ac-
cepted the possibility that international treaties could reform neither fed-
eral nor local legislation. It has also not established a final hierarchy be-
tween these laws. As I said, this perception is quite different from that
maintained in the United States. In particular, when we look at the supe-
riority of international treaties, vis a vis local laws, there is no Missouri
v. Holland 9 in Mexico.
At the same time, the relationship between domestic and interna-
tional law, the principle of federal constitution prevails in that no law
can undergo a reform unless it's substituted by another law that has ob-
served the same procedures that created the first law. The case of Holmes
v. Jennison° provides an example of this.
International treaties create a procedure that is different from laws,
both federal and local laws. As a result, no hierarchical relationship exits
among the laws. There are to guide conflict resolutions that state whether
a law is in contradiction to a treaty. In Mexico, the simple issue is
whether the law is constitutional or not. It's not a question of determin-
ing which has a greater weight, the local law or the international treaty.
Therefore, the Mexican Constitution provides the solution that requires
the adoption of non-executing treaties and the implementation of legisla-
tion for every international treaty in which Mexico is a party. However,
this recourse is still not in existence. The supremacy of the law which
Article 133 suggests for international treaties is applied as long as these
are in agreement with the Constitution.
The international agreement must be in accord with the Mexican
Constitution. By this I mean the creation, content, and the wording
should reflect that which the Constitution demands. I'm not only refer-
ring to the way it was created and formulated, approved by the president,
ratified by the Senate, etc. I also mean the content of the wording must
reflect Mexico's Constitution. This is another major difference between
Mexico and the United States because in the United States, the tradition
is that which is found in the case of Soderland or the case of Wright
Corporation, which Mr. Stewart alluded to in which the content of the
treaty in the United States can be any content, practically. However, in
our country we cannot reach that conclusion or we have not reached that
conclusion. There has not been any precedent established by the Supreme
Court that would interpret this or have this scope.
79. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
80. 39 U.S. 540, 544 (1840).
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So, in summary, looking at the cases that have already been men-
tioned by Ms. Garza as far as Oaxaca and Guadalajara regarding the im-
plementation of international agreement, the interpretation or reading of
those cases give us the conclusion that the laws involved with Jalisco
and Oaxaca were considered in those precedents as unconstitutional. As a
result, constitutional guarantees were provided to both parties because
those laws, according to the court's interpretation, violated Paragraph B
of Article 133 of the Constitution. It would against the legal tradition
that I've already mentioned to interpret those precedents in order to be
able to say that those state laws have been considered null and void be-
cause they are inconsistent with an international treaty.
I believe that would be an erroneous conclusion because the Su-
preme Court's decision mentions that those laws are unconstitutional. As
additional proof to its unconstitutionality is the fact that there's interna-
tional agreement that also provides those guarantees and those rights. So,
in our country any conflict between treaties and local laws has to do with
interpreting whether it's unconstitutional or not, not whether it is legal.
MS. GARZA: Thank you for your interesting presentation and for
giving us that historical perspective and pointing out where our Constitu-
tions may have similarities, even though our laws are applied differently.
Next we have Lic. Loretta Ortiz.
MS. ORTIZ: Well, the first part of my presentation is going to cover
the constitutional framework in the signing of international treaties. The
second part of my presentation is going to be a summary of the signing
of international laws which come directly from the Constitution.
During the first part of my presentation when I cover the Constitu-
tional framework, vis a vis the signing of international agreements, the
basis Constitutional articles are Article 89, Paragraph 10, which talks
about the power of the president in order to enter into international
agreements; Article 76, Paragraph 1, which talks about the power of the
legislature in order to approve or ratify said treaties; Article 15 of the
Constitution, which has already been cited, which establishes that no in-
ternational agreement can alter or abridge international freedoms; Article
117 of the Constitution, which prohibits federal as well as state authori-
ties to enter into international agreements on their own; Article 133 of
the Constitution, which has already been mentioned by Dr. Moctezuma
Barragan.
The Mexican legal system, in particular the Constitutional legal sys-
tem, is different because it has three different levels. It has the national,
federal, and local levels. At the national level, we have the Constitution
and other legal frameworks, such as the international treaty framework.
When the president of the country enters into an international treaty, he
does it as the head of state, and it's not really a question of distribution
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of federal or local jurisdictions. That is because the federal system is the
one that distributes authorities.
For example, we could place a decree of suspension of guarantees
within the national level or strata. The difference or the division between
the federal and local is specified in Article 124 of the Constitution,
which has already been mentioned. There are other issues that are also
covered in the text of the Constitution regarding the exercise of power
covering, for example, environment and health issues. These are excep-
tions were power is given to the federal government.
The international agreements provide a national legal framework.
Article 133 of the Constitution has to be in agreement with the Constitu-
tion. In the case of a conflict between one law passed by the congress, a
federal law, and an international treaty, the Constitution always is
supreme.
The text of Article 133 is from 1833. This Article is very similar to
Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution. It states that the laws of the congress
and the treaties will become the supreme law of the union when it is in
agreement with the Constitution. This text was reformed so as to clear up
any doubts regarding the international agreements. Now, international
agreements must be considered constitutional.
As Dr. Moctezuma Barragan clearly stated, the government of Mex-
ico adopted a dualistic doctrine regarding incorporating domestic law to
international agreement. The international agreements are subordinated to
Constitutional articles. They also must be in agreement with the local
laws.
Now, regarding the resolution of hierarchical conflicts between local
and federal levels, vis a vis an international agreement (This is proposed
in Article 133 of the Constitution), there is no doubt that the Constitu-
tional text establishes a hierarchical status between international agree-
ments and the congressional laws. In the case of a conflict between or
doubts as far as the implementation of one of these, the judicial or ad-
ministrative authorities would apply priority to that which is in accor-
dance with the Constitution. If one of those is not in accordance with the
Constitution then automatically it is considered null and void and the
treaty or agreement in accordance with the Constitution would be in
effect.
In the case of where both laws are in accordance with the Constitu-
tion, then we would see a dilemma as to which law would be imple-
mented. Would it be that approved by the congress or the international
agreement? We don't have any jurisprudence or precedent in which we
find this problem resolved as to how to resolve a conflict between a fed-
eral law and an international agreement or treaty resolved.
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As has already been stated, in order to resolve this problem we have
to repeal one law and substitute it with another. Article 127, as already
discussed, provides that the procedures formulating or creating a law or
international treaty are different procedures. One procedure is determined
in a congress at the domestic level. The other one is in an international
arena.
Our judicial system, as opposed to other systems like the Anglo
Saxon system, changes the nature of the treaties of law in order to incor-
porate it into its judicial system. We incorporate the treaty word by word,
verbatim, which implies that the principles of interpretation and imple-
mentation of that instrument are principles dictated by international
norms. In our case, we are signatories to the other convention and we
subscribe to one formula. It would be difficult to apply other principles
of interpretation. For example, the criminal code, trade code, or commer-
cial code would not provide helpful guidelines when we are interpreting
an international agreement. We apply or implement international princi-
ples of interpretation of said articles. Despite the fact that they are judi-
cial mechanisms, one cannot supplant or repeal the other.
Though it has not been resolved in any previous case before judicial
or administrative authorities, perhaps a better criteria for resolution would
be to resort to both standards. If there is a law that applies in the interna-
tional treaty, perhaps the solution would be to apply the law as a priority
in the case of a conflict between the international treaty and domestic
law. In any case, this is an issue that has not been resolved. The constitu-
tional wording specifies that the laws of the congress and international
treaties are the supreme law if they are in agreement with the
Constitution.
In the case of local laws the problem has been resolved in a very
express fashion. In Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution, it is stipu-
lated that the judges must, in the case of a conflict between local Consti-
tutions and local legislation, abide by what has been established by the
congress.81 We have an interesting, recent precedent, that was brought up
in a case of a Constitutional guarantee before the court, a conflict of the
Washington convention with the local legislation and the civil code. In
81. Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution states: "This Constitution, the laws of
the Congress of the Union which emanate therefrom, and all treaties made, or which shall
be made in accordance therewith by the President of the Republic, with the approval of
the Senate, shall be the Supreme Law throughout the Union. The Judges of every state
shall be bound to the said Constitution, the laws, and the treaties, notwithstanding and
contradictory provisions that may appear in the Constitution or laws of the States." MEX.
CONST. art. 133.
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that case, the court decided to give the international agreement priority
over the local law.
The constitutional considerations could then be brought down to the
constitutional regime. Until recently the treaty issue had not been decided
on in Mexico. The law on treaty celebration was only recently incorpo-
rated into the Constitution.8 2 The new law distinguishes between interna-
tional treaties and inter-institutional agreements. International treaties are
those signed by the president of the Republic which require ratification
by congress and are published in the Federal Register.8 3 Inter-institutional
agreements can be compared to North American executive agreements.
These are agreements carried out by any body of public government,
whether state or federal, with foreign governments or international orga-
nizations under international law.
The procedure to implement these agreements is much simpler be-
cause inter-institutional agreements do not require either the president's
signature or publication in the Federal Register. This agreement merely
needs to be notified as part of the treaty to the Foreign Ministry, its judi-
cial secretariat. Once a verdict is issued, it is registered under a record of
inter-institutional agreements kept by the Foreign Secretary.
And to finish, I will refer briefly to the problem of self-executory
standards or non-self-executory regulations, which derived from the sign-
ing of a treaty by Mexico. In Mexico, the courts have never solved an is-
sue related to international treaties that would not be applied because
they were not self-executory. In Mexico, for an international treaty, regu-
lations can be self-executory or not self-executory, and the whole treaty
may not necessarily be either self-executory or non-self-executory, but
rather the treaty could have a mix of these regulations or norms.
Though this issue has not been resolved by the courts because it has
never come up, several concerns do arise which we could characterize as
doctrinaire. First, who should implement on the local level an interna-
tional treaty which has been signed by the president of the Republic?
This includes those issues that are under the competency of the 124
clause which covers the jurisdiction of federal bodies,84 including all reg-
82. For further information on the new Mexican law regarding the making of trea-
ties, Antonio Garza Canovas from the Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of For-
eign Affairs, Mexico wrote an informative introductory note to accompany the text of the
law. See Antonio Garza Canovas, MExico: LAW REGARDING THE MAKING OF TREATIES, 31
I.L.M. 390 (1992).
83. See MEX. CONST. art. 89, §X.
84. Article 124 of the Mexican Constitution states, "The powers not expressly
granted by this Constitution to federal officials are understood to be reserved to the
States." MEX. CONST. art. 124.
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ulatory civil affairs such as adoptions, marriage or anything related to
common law.
Who is to implement these international treaties once the president
is empowered to sign them as the chief executive of the Mexican State?
This is an attribute given the president by the 89 Article, Paragraph 10
with no other limitation than those laid out by the Constitution.85 Under
the Mexican Constitution, the local or state legislatures would be in
charge of implementation. That is, the federal congress cannot implement
an international treaty which invades the jurisdiction of these state legis-
latures. Under Article 124 this would violate the separation of powers es-
tablished by the Constitution.8 6
In the case of implementation of international treaties, under federal
jurisdiction, the federal congress would be empowered to legislate or im-
plement international treaties because it is directly empowered by Article
73 of the Constitution. 87
MS. GARZA: Thank you very much for your comments, Mr. Ortiz.
Next our first panelist from Canada is Ton Zuijdwijk.
PRESENTATION OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION
MR. ZUIJDWIJK: I want to thank the dean of the law school for
hosting this event. My topic is the Canadian treaty-making practice. I
will deal with the theoretical underpinnings and practical implications,
first of treaty-making, and then I will go into treaty implementation at a
general level. Finally, I will make some specific comments about the la-
bor side agreement and International Labor Organization (hereinafter
"ILO") conventions.
Let me start off with treaty-making. In Canada we have a strictly
dualist system. Treaties for us are completely separate from domestic
law. By entering into treaties, Canada does not change domestic law. In
other words, we have no self-executing treaties whatsoever.
In Canada, treaty-making is an exercise by the federal government
of Canada of what is historically the crown's prerogative. It is the old
common law right of the sovereign to enter into agreements, on behalf of
the state, with other states.88 And in Canada this prerogative power is ex-
ercised by the Governor General. In a formal sense this power is dele-
gated by Queen Elizabeth II to the Governor General. 89 The treaty-
85. See MEX. CONST. art. 89, §X.
86. See MEx. CONST. art. 124.
87. See MEx. CONST. art. 73, §VI (amended 1987).
88. See A.E. GOTLiEB, CANADIAN TREATY MAKING 4-5 (1968).
89. The current instrument of delegation is entitled "Letters Patent Constituting the
Office of the Governor General of Canada," of 1947. See 1 HoG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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making power is exercised completely in Canada upon advice of Cana-
dian (federal) ministers.
Now, since treaty-making is an exercise of the crown prerogative,
the consequence is that there is no requirement for any formal involve-
ment by parliament for treaty-making. There is no requirement in the Ca-
nadian Constitution that treaties be submitted to the federal parliament
for approval. Treaty-making is purely an executive act. There is only a
need to involve Canada's legislative bodies if a treat requires changes in
domestic law. That is where the federal provincial angle comes into play
because some treaties require legislative changes in areas that are provin-
cial in nature and then the provincial legislatures need to get involved.
The British model on which Canada's system is based usually oper-
ates in a straightforward manner in a unitary state because the govern-
ment of the day controls parliament, goes out to negotiate treaties, and
then can pass whatever implementing legislation is needed because the
government usually controls parliament. In Canada the federal govern-
ment is usually able to ensure the adoption of implementing legislation
for matters that fall within federal jurisdiction. It is more complex when
we deal with matters that are within provincial jurisdiction.
Many treaties, of course, will not require implementing legislation.
For instance, in the defense field where Canada may agree to send troops
to a foreign country, that can be done strictly by administrative action
and no legislation is required. However, if the domestic law needs to be
changed, then we need to go to the Constitution and determine which
legislature has the legislative capacity to change the law.
Canada's federal parliament does not have a power similar to the
power that is vested in the U.S. Congress by virtue of the Missouri v.
Holland9° judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court. In fact, that question was
decided in 1937 by the Privy Council in London, which was then our
highest court.91 That early Privy Council decision held that the federal
parliament could not pass legislation pursuant to an international agree-
ment that would break the ordinary division of powers established by the
Constitution. 92
OF CANADA §11-2 (3d ed. 1992).
90. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that the Tenth Amendment, reserving powers not
delegated to the United States federal government, cannot invalidate a treaty if that treaty
has been held valid under Art. 1, Sec. 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the government.)
91. See Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario (Labour Con-
ventions) [1937] A.C. 326. The appeal to the Privy Council was abolished in 1949.
92. See HOGG, supra note 89 at §§11-10 - 11-12.
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In the absence of special treaty implementation powers for the Par-
liament in the Canadian Constitution, the scope of ordinary powers of the
federal parliament becomes of particular importance for the federal gov-
ernment. I believe Professor Howse will spend some time elaborating on
relevant federal powers in the Constitution.
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court of Canada may be
willing to give a more expansive interpretation to certain federal powers
if those powers are used by the federal government to implement an in-
ternational agreement.93 But this is very much leading edge, and in my
mind, it is largely speculative.
Now, if a matter that is dealt with in the treaty falls within provin-
cial jurisdiction, then concurrence of all the provinces will be sought by
the federal government before it will accept new international obliga-
tions. So, for a treaty that concerns labor, which is largely a provincial
matter, the federal government will first get the concurrence of the prov-
inces, unless there is a federal state clause 94 in the agreement.
Let me explain what a federal state clause is. A federal state clause
allows the federal government of Canada to enter into treaty obligations
in areas that are within provincial jurisdiction and accept such obligations
only in respect of those provinces that have been notified by the federal
government to its treaty partners. You find those clauses in certain of the
Hague Conventions on Private International Law.95 Another example is
the Vienna Convention on the Sale of Goods. 96
The clause that you find in Article 93(1) of the United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods reads
If a contracting state has two or more territorial units in which, according
to its constitution, different systems of law are applicable in relation to
93. See id. at §§11-15 - 11-16.
94. Professor Peter W. Hogg defines a "federal state clause" in his book "Constitu-
tional Law of Canada" as "a clause a federal state undertakes to perform only those obli-
gations which are within central executive or legislative competence, and undertakes
merely to bring to the notice of the provinces (or states or cantons), "with a favorable
recommendation" for action, those obligations which are within regional competence."
HOGG, CONSTITUIONAL LAW OF CANADA 252 (1985). Professor Hogg notes that Canada,
along with the United States and Australia, "have exercised caution in the making and
implementing of treaties upon subjects which would, apart from a treaty, be outside of
federal legislative competence . . . the caution stems from a general federal policy of
not wishing to intrude too vigorously into matters normally controlled by the states." Id.
at 252 n.52.
95. See e.g. Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Between
the United States of America and Other Governments at the Hague, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1998 WL 411501, art. 40.
96. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
(1980) 19 I.L.M. 671.
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the matters dealt with in this Convention, it may at the time of signature,
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, declare that this Conven-
tion is to extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them
and may amend this declaration by submitting another declaration at any
time.97
It is a very flexible device, but it may be difficult to obtain that
kind of clause in international negotiations. I should mention that in the
case of the Vienna Sales Convention,9" the federal government managed
to extend the Convention to all the provinces within 15 months from Ca-
nada's date of accession. Now the Convention applies to all 10 provinces
as well as the two territories. A similar provision can be found in Article
29 of the Convention of the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Rec-
ognition of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.99 That
Convention currently applies to seven out of 10 provinces.
Let me say a few words about labor law. Under the Canadian Con-
stitution, labor law is an area of split jurisdiction. Canadian labor law is
normally governed by provincial law, but there is an area of federal ju-
risdiction when dealing with businesses that is regulated by federal law.
For example, the banks, the airlines, and of course, the federal public
service are examples of operations that are governed by federal law. By
virtue of that, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that those employees
are subject to federal labor jurisdiction. 100 Percentage-wise, over 90 per-
cent of the employees in Canada are governed by provincial law, and
less than 10 percent by federal law.
It was in the light of the provincial jurisdiction over labor that it
was necessary for Canada to secure the special provisions of Annex 46
of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation' 0 ' (hereinafter
"NAALC") which is based on the classical federal state clause. How-
ever, the NAALC clause is more complicated because complex formulae
had to be worked out concerning when Canada could initiate a com-
plaint, on behalf of which provinces and when Canada could be expected
to defend the record of certain provinces in proceedings under the
NAALC. 10 2
97. Id.at art. 93, para. 1.
98. Id.
99. See [1984] 23 I.L.M. 1389.
100. See HOGG, supra note 89 at §§21-10 - 21-15.
101. See North American Free Trade Agreement Supplemental Agreements and Ad-
ditional Documents: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 1st. Sess., Annex
46, Arnold & Porter - H.R. Doc. 103-160, *48 (1993).
102. See id.
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Domestically, with respect to the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, 10 3
the federal government worked out a federal-provincial agreement with
the provinces which regulated the participation of the provinces in activi-
ties under the Labor Side Agreement. 1° 4 The provinces that wish to par-
ticipate have to sign on to the domestic agreement. Then the federal gov-
ernment will notify the U.S. and Mexico that these provinces are covered
by NAALC. 10 5 That has happened for Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec.
By contrast, the ILO conventions do not contain federal state
clauses. Thus, given that labor falls largely within provincial jurisdiction,
practical reality dictates that the federal government will seek provincial
concurrence before Canada adheres to an ILO convention.
Now, I come to my conclusions. The first one is that binding Ca-
nada at the international level is an executive act in which parliament is
not involved. Two, there are no self-executing treaties in Canada. Three,
there is no primacy of treaty law over domestic law. Fourth, both the
Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces have the ca-
pacity to legislate a contravention of international treaty obligations. Five,
if implementing legislation is required, then the ordinary division of pow-
ers between the federal level of government and the provinces will be
followed. Six, in the labor field, federal competence is limited to busi-
nesses that are federally regulated and to the public service. Therefore,
provincial involvement in the implementation of labor treaties is a given.
In the absence of a federal state clause, which I discussed, consent of all
the provinces will be sought by the federal government before it takes on
new international obligations in the labor field.
MS. GARZA: Thank you very much, Mr. Zuijdwijk for your presen-
tation on the status of treaties in Canada. I was glad that you pointed to
the NAALC because as many of you know Canada had not participated
with us in some of the submissions because of this Annex 461°6 and the
need to seek the approval of provincial governments and bring them onto
103. For discussion of the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, See Can the Labor Side
Agreement Save NAFTA? 1993: Hearings on the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement Before
the Employment, Housing, and Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), Arnold & Porter NAFTA HEARINGS (30).
See also North American Free Trade Agreement Supplemental Agreements and Addi-
tional Documents: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 1st Sess., Annex
46, Arnold & Porter - H.R. Doc. 103-160, *48 (1993).
104. See Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement Regarding the North American
Agreement on Labour Cooperation (visited December 8, 1998) <http://labour.hrdc-
drhc.gc.ca/doc/nafta/eng/e/final-e.html>.
105. See id.
106. See supra note 101.
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the agreement. So, thank you very much for that presentation. Next we
have Professor Robert Howse.
MR. HOWSE: Thank you. It is a pleasure to participate in this pro-
cess. The relevant Canadian constitutional law with respect to the imple-
mentation of treaties has already been pointed out. Its origins are in a
1937 decision not of a Canadian court but of the judicial committee of
the Privy Council, 0 7 which at that time was the court of last resort for
Canada since we had not yet broken with our imperial heritage.108 This
case essentially said that, with respect to the implementation of treaties
through legislation, and only through legislation, the normal division of
powers in the Canadian Constitution applies. I think that a number of
factors about this case ought to be mentioned in order to place it in con-
text and to perhaps give you a sense of its relevance or perhaps irrele-
vance if there were a constitutional challenge today related to the federal
government's activities in international relations.
First of all, as has been pointed out, it was not a decision of a Ca-
nadian court. Secondly, it is part of a series of decisions by the judicial
committee of the Privy Council which had the effect, or in the view of
some critics the intention, in the context of this ideological situation in
Canada in the 1930s, of constraining the development of the social wel-
fare state and defending private rights against the social welfare state. So,
this whole line of decisions of the Privy Council is kind of our Canadian
Lochner era' 09, and it has been widely criticized and to some extent
rightly discredited in decades of academic writing.
Now, this does not mean that the Supreme Court has ever overruled
this decision. It does mean that if these issues were to be placed before
the Supreme Court of Canada today there is far from any guarantee that
it would not adopt a very different conceptual approach to the problem.
So, think about this: we are dealing with a decision of a foreign court or
a foreign judicial body. We are a dealing with a decision that is 60 years
old and a decision that has been widely discredited in much of the aca-
demic writing surrounding this matter over a period of decades.
107. See id.
108. See supra note 91.
109. During the Lochner era, the U.S. courts used the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution to invalidate a variety of fed-
eral and state social and economic laws and arbitrary and unreasonable interferences with
the freedom to contract protected by the Due Process guarantees of liberty and property.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state law setting maximum
hours of employment unreasonably interfered with the relationship between master and
employee and therefore was an excessive burden on personal liberty and violated the Fed-
eral Constitution).
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So, take the Labor Convention's doctrine at the outset with a grain
of salt. It would be like interpreting the U.S. Constitution on some Loch-
ner era decision that for some reason or other happened never to have
been explicitly overruled by the United States Supreme Court.
Now, I think the extent to which the doctrine, even strictly inter-
preted, constrains the international relations powers of the federal govern-
ment in Canada, can be greatly exaggerated. It is very convenient in in-
ternational negotiations to be able to turn to the other party and say, as
Velma says in "Dangerous Liaisons," "It's beyond my control." This is
a matter of our domestic constitution and so we can not do this or that.
But the fact of the matter is that in some areas where Canada's in-
ternational obligations are profoundly related to provincial policies it has
not been "necessary" to have a federal state clause. One example, and a
very important example, is the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights" °. Recently some individuals from the province of Quebec took
Canada to the Human Rights Committee at the U.N. in Geneva on the
basis that the sign law in Quebec, which at the time prohibited most
commercial signs from being in languages other than French, violated the
guarantees of freedom of association and equality rights in the Civil and
Political Covenant."' These people were able to do this in part because
there was nothing like a federal state clause in the Civil and Political
Covenant." 2 The result was an agreement to which Canada was fully
bound without any federal state clause. So, the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mittee found that at least with respect to the freedom of association, this
Quebec law violated the guarantees of the Covenant." 3
It would have been very unlikely that the federal government would
have passed legislation to force the province of Quebec to change or
abolish this law which was clearly within provincial legislative compe-
tence. The province, nevertheless, did actually change the law, partly
under the moral pressure from a decision of the Human Rights
Committee.
Now, what is the lesson of all this? The lesson is that overriding
federal legislation which may be in violation of the Labor Convention's
110. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Com-
mittee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add. 6, 34 I.L.M. 839 (1995). See also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations Report, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992).
111. Several Canadian cases have ruled on the discriminatory effects of Quebec lan-
guage legislation which prohibits the use of any language other than French on commer-
cial signs. See Devine v. Quebec, 55 D.L.R. 641; Ford v. Quebec, 54 D.L.R. 577 (1988).
112. See supra note 110.
113. See id..
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interpretation of the Canadian Constitution is a crude and often unneces-
sary mechanism for ensuring provincial compliance with Canada's inter-
national obligations.
Secondly, even if moral persuasion is not enough, in other areas, for
example the labor area, there may be other means, other than federal
overriding legislation, which will get provinces to comply. For example,
the federal government of Canada recently entered into a number of
agreements concerning labor market training with a variety of Canadian
provinces. Now, why did the federal government not make compliance
with various kinds of international obligations in the labor field a condi-
tion of the federal transfers to provinces for spending in the area of labor
market training or indeed use that leverage to bring on board other prov-
inces with respect to the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement? It has nothing
to do with the Constitution. It was merely the decision not to use the
federal government's spending power leverage in this area.
So, we have to understand the politics as well as the law that is in-
volved. An enormous number of tools available to the federal govern-
ment facilitate provincial compliance. Moral persuasion also has value.
All this leads one to the conclusion that it would be entirely reasonable
for Canada, in many contexts, even where provincial jurisdiction is im-
plemented, to sign on to international agreements with the good faith be-
lief that one way or another it would be a very, very unlikely scenario
that the federal government actually would have to pass legislation in an
area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction in order to ensure that both obli-
gations ultimately were complied with.
Now, this leads me to the second mean dimension of my presenta-
tion, and this dimension really relates to the division of powers within
the Canadian federation. Labor conventions are a product of a very dif-
ferent era of thinking about the way that power is distributed in the Ca-
nadian Constitution. This era of thinking that has been characterized on
the basis of a dictum in one of the Privy Council's decision as the Water-
tight Compartments era. Today, again and again, the Supreme Court ju-
risprudence reflects the fact that there are many overlapping and concur-
rent areas of jurisdiction. It is very difficult to align in a complex,
interdependent policy environment specific categories of public policies
in the contemporary era when these ideas about exclusive powers come
from a constitutional text that is more than a century old and that was in-
vented before the modern regulatory and welfare state. Therefore, be ex-
tremely, extremely skeptical when anyone tells you that something is an
exclusive provincial power.
I would like to elaborate on this. Canada is not a confederal state.
Therefore, the residual power is conferred on the federal government in
Canada, thereby giving the federal government certain general powers:
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the power of peace, order, and good government; and the power of trade
and commerce, both international and interprovincial. When exercising
these kinds of general powers in accordance with criteria established by
the Canadian Supreme Court, the federal government's legislative action
will be held by the Court to be paramount to provincial legislation. This
doctrine of paramouncy in the case of an actual operational conflict be-
tween provincial and overriding federal legislation is a cornerstone of the
Canadian constitutional order and one of the reasons why it is inaccurate
to characterize that order as confederal as opposed to being genuinely
federal.
Now, it was suggested that these powers or their influence on the
labor conventions doctrine is largely speculative. Well, maybe one can
have more than one definition of speculative. However, there have been
recent Supreme Court decisions that have suggested that the federal gov-
ernment does have the scope to legislate in matters that would otherwise
be matters of exclusive provincial jurisdiction where there is a genuine
national dimension. A national dimension can include the fact that there
is an international dimension, that a matter that would otherwise nor-
mally be a provincial jurisdiction has become in effect through globaliza-
tion or through the expansion of the domain of international relations a
matter that is national in scope.
This does not give the federal government unlimited capacity to
trench on provincial jurisdiction. It can only do so to the extent neces-
sary to vindicate this national dimension. But I would refer you to the
extremely important decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in the
Crown Zellerbach14 case where the Court found that federal legislation
that dealt with environmental matters, which all the jurisprudence up to
that point had suggested were exclusively provincial because they related
to pollution in intraprovincial, that is inside the province waters, that the
federal legislation was nevertheless valid because it was connected to an
international regime for the regulation of pollution in maritime waters.
There are a number of other cases as well where similar kind of rea-
soning has existed, particularly in private international law, where it actu-
ally turns out that the Supreme Court, for example in the decision of
Hunt v. T & N1 5 suggested that the federal government may actually be
able to legislate with respect to civil procedure, a matter that is usually
considered exclusive provincial jurisdiction, again where economic mo-
bility is involved across provincial lines, mobility across international
lines, and therefore that there's a genuine national dimension even though
114. R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401.
115. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289.
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the matter is strictly speaking or a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdic-
tion. There is a lot of scope for the federal government if it really needs
to pass legislation implementing agreements even if there is going to be
some kind of trenching on provincial jurisdiction.
When taken altogether, this is one reason why those provinces had
decided or seemed to decide have decided to constitutionally challenge
the NAFTA withdrew that constitutional challenge. I encountered one of
the premiers in one of those provinces, I asked him why that province
had withdrawn its challenge or never actually put forward its promised
challenge to the constitutionality of NAFTA or the challenge that
NAFTA interfered with provincial jurisdiction and therefore labor con-
ventions meant it was au travers the federal government. He said be-
cause they thought that would lose their challenge.
This summarizes the current status. One can question whether labor
conventions ultimately really matter anymore. If no one asserted them-
selves and stalled the interpretation of the Canadian constitution and the
functioning of the Canadian political order in the colonial era of the
1930's, then one really has to ask the question whether labor conventions
matter anymore.
MS. GARZA: Thank you very much, Professor Howse, for your
presentation, and last but not least we have Professor Sophie Dufour.
MS. DUFOUR: I will discuss first the approach which has been
used by Canada regarding the implementation of international treaties.
Also, I will discuss the way the Province of Quebec implements the trea-
ties in Quebec law.
Canada's Implementation of ILO Conventions
So, I will first start by looking at the way Canada implements ILO
conventions and specifically, Convention 87 on Freedom of Associa-
tion.1 6 The International Labor Organization sprang from the Treaty of
Versailles of 1919" 7 following the cessation of hostilities of the First
World War. As a signatory to that treaty, Canada played an important
role in the founding of the ILO. 1" 8
By the standard of those times, Canada had a well developed system
of labor law, and it regarded the establishment of the ILO as designed
116. Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right
to Organize, Mar. 23, 1948, ILO, International Labor Conventions and Recommendations
(1982).
117. Treaty of Versailles, Jun. 28, 1919, pt. XIII, ch. 1, arts. 387, 388, 2 Bevans
242.
118. The treaty was signed "for the Dominion of Canada" by the Canadian minis-
ters of Finance and Justice.
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primarily to enable newly emerging democratic states to adopt fair and
reasonable labor standards and therefore, as having a far less significant
role to play in affecting its labor relation regime. Although Canada be-
longed to the ILO since its inception, it has ratified only 29 of the 176
ILO conventions, 119 including Convention 87 on Freedom of Associa-
tion, 120 Convention 111 on Discrimination in Employment,'12 and Con-
vention 100 on Equality of Remuneration. 22
This may be better than the United States' record in this regard. As
Professor Aaron pointed out earlier, the United States has only ratified 12
conventions.123 However, it is far from being significant. The question
therefore to be asked is why Canadian interests in the ratification of ILO
conventions seem to have been so slight? The answer lies mainly on two
Privy Council decisions, rendered in 1925 and in 1937.
The 1925 decision in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider124 al-
tered the distribution of powers over labor law by deciding that labor re-
lations in most industries came within the exclusive provincial jurisdic-
tion over property and civil rights in the Province under Section 92(13)
of the Constitutional Act of 1867.125 Accordingly, the federal Industrial
Disputes Investigation Act was rendered inapplicable to most workers.
Ever since this decision, the provincial governments, rather than Ottawa,
have been the major players in Canadian labor law.
The second Privy Council decision which affected Canadian labor
law was rendered in 1937 in the Labor Conventions case. Although I do
not intend to examine it deeply, I will make some brief comments.
In 1935, the federal government ratified three ILO conventions.
Those were Convention 1 on Maximum Hours in the Industry,' 2 6 Con-
vention 14 on Weekly Rest, 127 as well as Convention 26 on Minimum
Wages. 28 These three conventions deal with the subject matters which
fall mainly within provincial legislative powers under Section 92(13) of
the Constitutional Act of 1867.
119. Search of ILOLEX (Nov. 17, 1998) (search of ILO's database on International
Labor Standards).
120. See supra note 116.
121. Convention 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), Nov. 26,
1964, ILO, International Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
122. Convention 100 on the Equality of Remuneration, Nov. 16, 1972, ILO, Interna-
tional Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
123. Search of ILOLEX (Nov. 15, 1998).
124. [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5.
125. CAN. CONST. Sec. 92(13).
126. Convention 1 on Hours of Work (Industry), Mar. 21, 1935.
127. Convention 14 on Weekly Rest (Industry), Mar. 21, 1935.
128. Convention 26 on Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery, Apr. 25, 1935.
270 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
During the same year (1935), the Canadian parliament passed maxi-
mum hours, weekly rest, and minimum wages statutes in order to imple-
ment the three ILO conventions. In 1937, the Privy Council held this Ca-
nadian federal legislation unconstitutional because it infringed upon
provincial legislative powers. According to the Privy Council, although
the power to sign international treaties stems from the federal prerogative
and, therefore, rests in the federal government, the power to implement
such international treaties in Canadian domestic law is subject to the di-
vision of legislative powers established under Sections 91 and 92 of the
Constitutional Act of 1867.129
When international agreements undertaken by the Canadian govern-
ment cover subjects dealing with provincial matters under the Constitu-
tion, the provincial parliaments have the exclusive power to implement
these engagements in Canadian domestic law. The Labor Conventions
case affected the Canadian government's approach to the ratification of
the ILO conventions promulgated after World War II. As compliance
with most of the conventions fell exclusively within provincial legislative
power, the federal government took initially the cautious view that it
should not ratify conventions whose subject matter falls within provincial
competence.
By the 1950's, however, the Canadian government took the bolder
approach of consulting with provinces on convention ratification. For ex-
ample, the Canadian government ratified Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association in 1972, after all the provincial governments agreed to ratifi-
cation and to bring their laws into line with the Convention.
By 1980, Canada had ratified fewer ILO conventions than it might
have been expected. First, there was the problem of the division of fed-
eral and provincial legislative powers. Second, due to Canada's relatively
good labor relations and human rights record, there was little public pres-
sure to ratify more conventions.
Of the six ILO conventions governing freedom of association and
collective bargaining, Canada has ratified only Convention 87, leaving
unadopted Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and to Bargain Col-
lectively,130 Convention 135 on Workers' Representatives,13 1 Convention
141 on the Rural Workers, 132 Convention 151 on Labor Relations in the
129. CAN. CONST. §§ 91-92.
130. Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, Jul. 7, 1949,
ILO, International Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
131. Convention 135 Concerning Workers' Representatives, Jun. 23, 1971, ILO, In-
ternational Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
132. Convention 141 on Rural Workers' Organization, Jun. 23, 1975, ILO, Interna-
tional Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
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Public Service, 133 and Convention 154 on the Promotion of Collective
Bargaining.134
Canada is nonetheless bound by the provisions included in these
conventions since all member states are required to honor the freedom of
association and collective bargaining principles embodied in the ILO
Constitution. 135 Complaints can in fact be submitted by national or inter-
national associations of workers or employees against a member state al-
leging non-conformity with ILO principles on freedom of association and
collective bargaining, regardless of whether it has ratified the relevant
ILO conventions. These complaints are examined by the ILO Committee
on Freedom of Association, a tripartite committee of the ILO Governing
Body created in 1950, which meets three times a year, in March, June,
and November in Geneva.
The Committee examines the complaints and reports its recommen-
dations and the type of action to be taken on each case to the ILO Gov-
erning Body. It does not, however, have the power to decide on matters
presented to it.
This ILO complaint system did not seem to have much influence in
encouraging the Canadian federal and provincial governments to comply
with these ILO conventions dealing with freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining. In fact, between 1980 and 1994, Canada was subject
to 43 complaints alleging non-compliance to one of these principles. In
65% of these complaints, the Committee concluded that the federal or the
provincial legislation or practice was not in conformity with ILO princi-
ples and called upon the government concerned to make changes.
The vast majority (72%) of the complaints involved the public sec-
tor. Yet, despite the fact that the ILO Committee on Freedom of Associa-
tion has alerted the Canadian federal and provincial governments repeat-
edly, there has been little impact on Canadian domestic legislation, which
has essentially remained unchanged.
Might there be another reason, besides the problem of the division
of federal and provincial legislative powers, which explains this Canadian
federal and provincial governments' attitude towards the ILO Committee
on Freedom of Association's recommendations? An answer perhaps lies
in the coming into force in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
133. Convention 151 on Labor Relations (Public Service), Jun. 27, 1978, ILO, Inter-
national Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
134. Convention 154 on the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, Jun. 19, 1981,
ILO, International Labor Conventions and Recommendations (1982).
135. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Jun. 28, 1919, annex, ch.
272 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Freedoms. 136
In 1982, the Canadian Parliament adopted the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which ushered in a new era in Canadian constitutionalism.
Section 2(d) of the Charter guarantees the freedom of association, subject
to certain limitations. At the time of the adoption of the Charter, the Ca-
nadian Trade Union movement did not perceive that the Charter would
affect Canadian industrial relations. As a result, it appeared to take little
interest in the hearings, discussions, and debates which led to its
adoption.
Yet, once the Charter became operational, 37 it did have a significant
impact on labor management relations. In particular, in three decisions
rendered in 1987, the Canadian Supreme Court interpreted the freedom
of association guaranteed in Section 2(d) as excluding a constitutional
right to strike. In so doing, the Supreme Court disregarded the ILO Su-
pervisory Body's recognition of the right to strike as one of the essential
means available to workers for the promotion and the protection of their
interests as provided for in Convention 87.
In fact, although none of the 176 ILO Conventions explicitly pro-
vides for the right to strike, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions1 3 held as early as 1959 that strike activity is im-
plicitly protected by Convention 87. The same principle was later
recognized by the ILO Freedom of Association Committee. Conse-
quently, in the current ILO view, prohibitions of or restrictions to the
right to strike should be limited to: (i) public servants engaged in the ad-
ministration of the State; and (ii) and essential services.
Since 1983, the ILO supervisory bodies have defined "essential ser-
vices" as those "whose interruption would endanger the life, personal
safety, or health of the whole or part of the population." 139 In most Cana-
dian complaints submitted by provincial or national unions involving
back-to-work legislation, the ILO Freedom of Association Committee
concluded that the provincial or federal legislation was not in conformity
with Convention 87 since the services in question, whether it be postal
services, railways, grain handling, and teaching, were not "essential" as
136. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (Apr. 17, 1982).
137. Id.
138. The Committee of Experts is composed of independent legal experts appointed
by the ILO director General in consultation with the Governing Body. Its functions are:
to examine the reports which each Member State is requied to periodically submit on the
implementation of Conventions which it has ratified; and to submit each year a report on
its findings to the annual ILO Conference.
139. International Labor Office, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining,
International Labour Conference, 81st Session, Geneva, 1994, para. 159.
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defined above. 140
Yet, the Canadian Supreme Court refused to infer a constitutional
right to strike from the freedom of association guaranteed in Section 2(d)
of the Charter. In one of the 1987 cases, Justice McIntyre, after having
concluded that the Charter could not, on its face, support an implication
of a right to strike, mentioned another reason based on social policy. He
said
Labour law . . . is based upon a political and economic compro-
mise between organized labor - a very powerful socioeconomic
force - on the one end, and the employers of labor - an equally
powerful socioeconomic force - on the other. The balance be-
tween the two forces is delicate and the public at large depends
for its security and welfare upon the maintenance of that balance.
The whole process is inherently dynamic and unstable. Care must
be taken then in considering whether constitutional protection
should be given to one aspect of this dynamic and evolving pro-
cess while leaving the other subjects to the social pressures of
the day . . . To intervene in that dynamic process at this early
stage of Charter development by implying constitutional protec-
tion for a right to strike would, in my view, give to one of the
contending forces an economic weapon . . . which could go far
towards freezing the development of labor relations and curtailing
that process of evolution necessary to meet the changing circum-
stances of a modem society in a modem world.14 1
The Charter has become the repository of Canada's rights and free-
dom, including the freedom of association. Over the last 15 years, the
Canadian Supreme Court has grappled with the scope and breadth of
these freedoms, and the Canadian Trade Union movement has been
caught up in this litigation. This focus of the Court on the Charter means
that there has been less need to look to international instruments, includ-
ing 1LO conventions, for guidance on human rights.
140. See Bureau International du Travail, La libert6 syndicale, 4th 6d., Gen~ve,
1996, para. 572; Canada, Office of the Interntional Affairs, Freedom of Association
Comlaints Submitted to the ILO Against Canada 1980-1994, Ottawa, 1995, 7.
141. In re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 414-15.
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I will now discuss the approach which has been adopted by the
Province of Quebec on the question of the implementation of interna-
tional treaties in Quebec law.
The Approach Adopted by the Province of Quebec on the Question of the
Implementation of International Treaties
Faced with the phenomenon of the growing economic and social in-
terdependence between States, the Quebec government has felt over the
years, and more specifically over the recent years, that it had to take
measures to open its frontiers. It was in response to this concern that An
Act Respecting the Minist~re des Affaires Internationales du Quebec was
adopted in December 1988142 the object of which was to ensure that the
Quebec government sets forth a coherent and efficient international
presence.
By virtue of Section 11 of the Act, the minister of International Af-
fairs has the responsibility of planning, organizing, and directing the for-
eign activities of the Quebec government.1 43 In this regard, Section 17 of
the Act illustrates the fact that the development of the codification of in-
ternational law springs mainly from international treaties. 144 It states that
"The Minister shall make recommendations to the Government as to the
ratification of international treaties or accords in fields with the constitu-
tional jurisdiction of Quebec." 145
The practice which has been developed by the Quebec government
regarding treaties and accords covered by Section 17 is for it to commu-
nicate its agreement to the signature by Canada of such a treaty or ac-
cord. This communication is made by means of a letter sent from the
provincial International Affairs minister to the federal Secretariat of State
on External Affairs. Then, the federal government formally asks each
provincial government whether or not it consents to the submission of
Canada's ratification instrument, which, on occasion, may contain reser-
vations as well as declarations specifically required by the provinces.
In order to verify the conformity of Quebec domestic law with the
international instrument, the Quebec government will generally initiate
inter-ministerial consultations. If Quebec domestic law appears to be con-
sistent with the terms and the spirit of the international treaty and where
the Quebec government concludes that it has an interest in being subject
142. Act of November 10, 1988, ch. 41, 1988 S.Q. 663 (Act concerning the Minis-
tere des Affaires Intemationales).
143. Id. at 669.
144. Id. at 670.
145. Id.
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to this treaty, then it will adopt an Order in Council by virtue of Section
17 of the Act.
However, in case of inconsistency between Quebec domestic law
and the international instrument, the Quebec government will take the ap-
propriate legislative measures to implement the treaty in question. It will
then communicate in writing its consent to the treaty's ratification by the
federal government. Ottawa and the provinces then agree to fix a date for
the coming into force of the convention throughout the country.
As previously pointed out, while discussing the ILO Conventions, it
must be kept in mind that, as a result of the Labor Conventions case, al-
though the power to sign international treaties vests in the federal gov-
ernment, the power to implement such international treaties in Canadian
domestic law is subject to the division of legislative jurisdictions as es-
tablished under Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitutional Act of 1867.146
In practice, when an international treaty deals with subject matters
falling within provincial jurisdiction, as it is often the case in human
rights and labor law issues, the federal government will usually consult
the provinces and, in the absence of a federal state clause, will await
their consent before signing, ratifying, or adhering to such a treaty.
The Quebec government has ratified or declared itself bound by sev-
eral international instruments. For instance, federal provincial cooperation
has been quite efficient in matters relating to human rights. This success
results mainly from the fact that since 1975, there has been a permanent
federal-provincial Committee responsible for the implementation of the
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,147 the
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, 48 and the Optional
Protocol of the latter.149
The federal-provincial cooperation achieved through this permanent
committee has resulted in the adherence of Canada to both the covenants
and the Protocol, thanks to assurances given by the provinces that they
would implement them within their territories. In this regard, Quebec rat-
ified the two covenants as well as the Protocol through the adoption of
an Order in Council in April, 1976. In doing so, the Quebec government
146. CAN. CONST. §§91-92.
147. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 6.A.Res. 2200A(XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966),
993 UNTS 3.
148. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 6.A.Res. 2200A(XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
UNTS 171.
149. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 UNTS 171.
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has agreed to respect, to guarantee, and to ensure the full exercise in
Quebec of the rights incorporated in the covenants.
Besides the covenants and the Optional Protocol, the Quebec gov-
ernment has undertaken, by virtue of an Order in Council, to ensure the
respect of the rights recognized in the following conventions: (i) The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, '50the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,' 5' the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 52 and the Convention on
the Rights of Child. 53
The labor law sector is also one where federal-provincial coopera-
tion has been essential in order that the treaties ratified by the Govern-
ment of Canada can be implemented throughout the country. As men-
tioned before, Canada is one of the founders of the ILO. The norms
developed at the ILO take either the form of a convention or of a recom-
mendation. Section 19(7) of the ILO Constitution provides that, in re-
gards to federative member states, the federal government shall, if it
seems appropriate given its constitutional system, conclude effective ar-
rangements with the provinces so that the conventions and the recom-
mendations adopted by the ILO Conference will be submitted to the pro-
vincial authorities for legislative or other action.
The federal government must also, subject to the provincial govern-
ments' consent, take measures to establish periodic consultations in order
to develop a coordinated action within Canada for the implementation of
these instruments.
It is worth noting that the Quebec government has declared itself
bound by only one ILO convention, that is Convention 162 relating to
security in the use of asbestos. 54 The implementation of this convention
in Quebec domestic law required modifications to the Security Code for
the Construction Industry.' 55
Finally, in international trade law matters, the Quebec government
has declared itself in favor of several international trade agreements. In
150. The Status of Women, 1980 U.N.Y.B. 885, Sales No. E.83.I.1 [Order in Council
2894-81, Oct. 20, 1981].
151. Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1969 U.N.YB. 484,
Sales No. E.71.I.1 [Order in Council 1471-778, May 10, 1978].
152. Protection from Torture and Other Cruel or Inhuman Treatment, 1975 U.N.Y.B.
620, Sales No. E.77.I.1 [Order in Council 912-78, June 19 1987].
153. The Rights of the Child, 1989 U.N.Y.B. 560, Sales No. E.97.I.1 [Order in
Council 1676-911, December 9, 1991].
154. Order in Council 2025-87, December 22, 1987, [1988] 120 0.6.11 403.
155. Amendments to the Safety Code for the Construction Industry, adopted by
O.C., Jan. 17, 1987, [1988] 1200.6.11 403.
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An Act Respecting the Implementation of International Trade Agree-
ments, assented on the 13th of June, 1996,156 the Quebec government has
given its support to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
North American Agreements on Environmental Cooperation and on La-
bor Cooperation, and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. 5
7
This legislation expresses Quebec's intention to .bring its laws into
harmony with international obligations to which it subscribes and thus
ensures the implementation of these international agreements within the
provincial territory. In the preamble of the Act, the Quebec government
affirms that Quebec alone is competent to implement those agreements in
each field coming under its jurisdiction."8
As we can see, Section 17 of the Act Respecting the Minist~re des
Affaires Internationales du Qu6bec illustrates the fact that the Province of
Quebec subscribes to the method generally used for arriving at a consen-
sus at the international level, that is to say, the adherence to an interna-
tional treaty.
One thing which has to be kept in mind regarding the implementa-
tion of international treaties by Quebec is that these agreements will bind
Quebec only if the government has declared itself to be so bound
through an Order in Council. In the case where it has done so, it must
then take the necessary measures to implement the convention and to en-
sure the respect of its provisions within its territory.
156. Act of June 13, 1996, ch. 6, 1996 S.Q. 335 (respecting the implementation of
international trade agreements in Quebec).
157. Id.
158. Id.

